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INTRODUCTICXJ 
One's attitude about and perception of others has historically 
been seen by mental health professionals as an important determinant 
of good mental health or of psychopathology. Horney (1937, 1945, 
1950) maintained that neuroses developed from one of three rigidly 
maintained stances regarding others; moving toward others, moving 
against others, or moving away from others. Alternately, Froram (1939, 
1941, 1956) em^iasized that loving oneself and loving others are both 
essential for healthy, adaptive functioning. Social and abnormal 
p^chology, then, have always been partners of a sort. 
Currently this partnership is working very well in the stu<fy of 
depression. Recently, cognitive theories have gained ascendancy in 
the understanding of depression (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). While these 
theories do not make explicit predictions about how depressives 
perceive or are perceived by others, they do clearly borrow 
explanatory constructs from social psychology. Furthermore a number 
of recent articles have examined depressive 0ienomena from a social 
psychological perspective. For exanple Gibbons (1986) has looked at 
social comparison in depression; Strack and Coyne (1983) have 
described the interpersonal inpact of depressives, as well as the 
reactions and responses of others to depressed persons; Hoehn-Hyde, 
Schlottman, and Push (1982) have reported perceptions of social 
interactions unique to depressives; and Forgas, Bower, and Krantz 
(1984) have revealed the influence of experimentally-induced mood on 
assessments and recollections of social behavior. Clearly social and 
'<4 
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abnormal psychology can interact to illuminate depressive jAienomena. 
The present study was designed to examine several aspects of the 
social comparison and attributional processes of depressives. Among 
the specific questions addressed by the present study are the 
following: What expectations do depressed persons have about how 
others will perform relative to themselves? Do depressives have a 
distinct "attributional style" regarding the successes and failures of 
others? What iirpact does information about the performance of others 
have on subsequent attributions about their own performance? Do they 
distort information about the performance of others? These and other 
questions will be explored in detail. 
Before proceeding further we will need to describe the current 
cognitive models of depression, and review relevant information 
regarding attribution theory and person perception among depressed and 
nondepressed persons. 
Beck's Cognitive Model of Depression 
Theoretical Considerations 
Aaron Beck's model of depression was derived substantially from 
his clinical observations of depressed patients as a psychiatrist in 
private practice (Beck & Hurvich, 1959; Beck, 1961). Although he 
originally viewed depression as a motivational deficit, he later 
became convinced that the deficit was primarily cognitive in nature 
(Beck, 1967). He relies upon three cognitively-oriented constructs to 
explain depressive behavior and affect (Beck, 1976). 
The first of these concepts is what Beck (1967, 1974) has called 
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the "cognitive triad." During a depressive episode this triad is 
activated and induces the depressed person to respond emotionally and 
behaviorally in a negative and self-defeating manner. Wie first 
coirponent of the triad is the negative view of oneself (i.e., 
helplessness). The depressed person sees him/herself as deficient, 
inadequate, or unworthy and tends to attribute negative experiences to 
some defect of their personality, intelligence or physical capacity. 
These putative defects make the person undesirable and worthless in 
their own view, and they tend to underestimate themselves because of 
them. Further, they come to believe they lack the attributes 
considered essential for attainment of happiness—or at least 
contentment. 
The second component of the triad is the person's distorted 
interpretations of the events around him or her. They tend to see the 
world as making extreme demands or presenting insurmountable obstacles 
which prevent them from reaching life's goals. %e person 
consistently misinterprets interactions with the environment as 
evidence of defeat. These misinterpretations become apparent when one 
observes that the person negatively construes situations and outcomes, 
even when less negative, more believable alternative interpretations 
are available (Kovacs & Beck, 1979). 
The third component of the triad consists of having a negative 
view of the future (i.e., hopelessness). The depressed person 
anticipates that present difficulties or negative outcomes will 
continue indefinitely. Whenever s/he contemplates undertaking a 
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specific task, s/he expects to fail. Thus, the person is unable to 
see the future as holding more promise than the present as it 
currently appears. As we shall see. Beck's cognitive triad 
corresponds nicely with the depressive attributional style identified 
by the revised learned helplessness theory (Abramson, Seligman & 
Teasdale, 1978). According to the latter, the depressed person tends 
to make internal (cf. Beck's "self"), global (cf. Beck's "world"), and 
stable (cf. Beck's "future") attributions for failures. We will 
discuss this revised learned helplessness model in more detail below. 
According to Beck's cognitive model, the other components of the 
depressive symptom cluster are consequences of the activation of these 
negative cognitive patterns. The emotional synptoms (feelings of 
sadness) can be analyzed in terms of these negative cognitions. If a 
person incorrectly believes s/he is being rejected, s/he will react 
with the same affect which occurs with actual rejection. The 
motivational changes in depression (failure to initiate activity, 
wishing to escape situations and avoid people, indecisiveness) are 
also related to negative cognitions. Since the depressed person 
anticipates failure, s/he is reluctant to commit hin/herself to goal-
oriented activity (Loeb, Feshback, Beck, & Wolf, 1964). Negative 
expectations also give rise to avoidance and escape wishes. Suicidal 
thoughts, for example, can be seen as an extreme expression of the 
desire to escape from what appears to be an insoluble problem or 
unbearable situation. Since the depressed person sees hin/herself as 
a worthless burden, they cane to believe that everyone will be better 
off when th^ are dead. Finally, indecisiveness results when the 
person believes that any decision s/he makes will turn out to be 
incorrect. 
The "cognitive triad" of negativity about self, world and future 
is the first cognitively-oriented contstruct in Beck's theory. The 
second cognitively-oriented construct used Beck is the notion of 
specific cognitive distortions and logical errors made by depressives 
in information processing (Beck, 1963). These thought processes are 
not specific to depression, but are "chronically atypical among 
depressed patients and may represent a stable characteristic of their 
personality" (Kovacs & Beck, 1979, p. 530). One such logical error, 
"arbitrary inference," occurs when someone reaches a conclusion in the 
absence of sufficient evidence, or contrary to the existing evidence. 
"Selective abstraction," another type of logical error, occurs when 
someone focuses on a trivial detail of a situation, and interprets the 
entire situation in the light of this detail, to the exclusion of 
other, more salient aspects of the situation. A third logical error, 
"overgeneralization," occurs when a person shows a consistent tendency 
to draw a sweeping conclusion on the basis of a single incident. 
"Magnification" and "minimization" are other errors which consist of 
making evaluations of a situation which are so grossly in error as to 
constitute distortion. Finally, "personalization" occurs when a 
person tends to interpret fortuitous events in terms of oneself when 
there is no objective justification for doing so. 
Cie depressive "cognitive triad" and the occurrence of logical 
6 
errors in information processing constitute two cognitive constructs 
in Beck's model of depression, The third cognitively-related 
construct employed in Beck's model is the notion of a self schema. 
Schemata have a lengthy history in cognitive pi^chology, being 
employed most notably in Piaget's (1954/1983, 1964/1967, 1969/1970, 
1970/1971) theory of cognitive development. Piaget identified a 
schema as a "mode of reaction that can be repeated and that, even more 
inçortantly, can be generalized" (1954/1983, p. 51), and also as a 
"motor system and perceptual organization" (1964/1967, p. 10) which 
can relate to persons or dDjects. Piaget (1954/1983) hypothesized 
that interpersonal schemes make the subject react to people in a more 
or less constant fashion in analogous situations, even though the 
persons with whom s/he is interacting may vary. Schemes of this sort 
have their origins in the child's reactions to his/her parents, and 
the schematization of the individual's affective and cognitive 
reactions make up his/her character (p. 51). 
For Beck (1976) schemata constitute the basis for attenuating, 
differentiating, and encoding stimuli. As such, schemata produce a 
predictable pattern of interpretations of specific sets of situations 
in an individual. Through a matrix of schemata the individual 
perceives and classifies experiences, forming the data into cognitions 
(mental activities with verbal contents). Bie schemata activated in 
specific situations determine the affective responses to those 
situations, though schemata may be Tstent at a given time, they can 
be activated by certain circumstances which are analogous to 
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experiences which initially gave rise to the schemata (Kovacs & Beck, 
1978). The cognitive distortions and logical errors of the depressed 
person are due to negatively biased schemata which assume a dominant 
role in the thought processes of the depressed person. Ihese biased 
schemata interfere with reality testing and reasoning. Bie usual 
rational correspondence of stimulus and appropriate schema is 
interrupted by the intrusion of predominant, idiosyncratic schemata 
which displace the more appropriate ones. As these inappropriate ' 
schemata become more active, they are evoked by a wider array of 
stimuli which are even more distantly related to them. %e 
depressive's conceptualization of reality situations is then distorted 
to fit the schemata (Rush & Weissenburger, 1982). 
In summary. Beck's model of depression relies heavily on a 
cognitive substrate which evokes motivational, behavioral and 
emotional deficits. The cognitive substrate peculiar to depression 
involves three explanatory constructs; the "cognitive triad" of 
negativity regarding self, world, and future; logical errors and 
cognitive distortions found among (but not necessarily unique to) 
depressives; and negative schemata which are evoked by, but 
inappropriately applied to, certain situations. 
Empirical Considerations 
Several correlational studies have demonstrated a positive 
relationship between depression measures and measures of self-esteem, 
providing evidence for the depressive's negative view of self (Beck, 
1967, 1974; Pachman & Fey, 1978). Furthermore, investigations have 
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repeatedly shown that depressives tend to expect less of themselves 
than nondepressed persons. Following the completion of tasks 
depressives tend to underestimate and underevaluate their performance. 
Loeb, Beck and Diggory (1971) exposed depressed and nondepressed 
subjects to a card-sorting task, asking them prior to their 
performance to estimate the probability they would succeed. The 
depressed subjects indicated that they would try as hard as the 
nondepressed subjects, and objectively they did perform as well as the 
nondepressed subjects. However, they were significantly less 
optimistic in estimating their chances of success and rated themselves 
as performing more poorly than did the nondepressed controls. Giles 
(1983) obtained similar results with a group of depressed inpatient 
females on two tasks: an inçersonal card-sorting task and an 
interpersonal problem-solving procedure. 
Hypothesizing that depressives will inappropriately blame 
themselves for negative outcomes Rizley (1978) performed two 
experiments to assess distortion in the attribution of causality of 
depressives. In the first, depressed and nondepressed subjects 
performed a task over which, unknown to them, thqr had no control. 
The depressed subjects tended to assume more personal responsibility 
for failure, but less responsibility for success, than the 
nondepressed. In the second experiment depressed subjects assumed 
more internal responsibility for both success and failure on an 
interpersonal task. Similarly Kuiper (1978) found that depressives 
assumed more responsibility (made more internal attributions) for both 
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success and failure on a word association task. 
Empirical evidence has also accumulated for the depressive's 
"negative view of the world." Mener and Rehm (1975) found that 
depressed subjects significantly underestimated the percentage of 
"correct" feedback they received in a laboratory task. Similarly 
Nelson and Craighead (1977) used a fixed reinforcement schedule with 
subjects performing a task. Ihey predicted that depressed subjects 
would underestimate the frequency of positive reinforcement they 
received and overestimate the frequency of punishment, with respect to 
nondepressed subjects. Hie authors also proposed that this effect 
would be greatest in high-positive and lew-negative reinforcement 
conditions, since these schedules would be least consistent with 
subjects' expectations. Both hypotheses were confirmed. 
Hammen and Glass (1975) found that, contrary to what would be 
predicted from an operant learning model of depression, depression was 
not alleviated when participation in pleasurable activities was 
experimentally increased for two weeks. Instead, depressed subjects 
who increased these activities rated them as less pleasurable than 
either nondepressed subjects or depressed controls who did not 
increase their activities. Finally, Buchwald (1977) found a positive 
correlation between depressed mood and the tendency to underestimate 
positive reinforcement. 
Negativity about the future in depressives has been demonstrated 
by Beck (1974), who reported a correlation between severity of 
depression, negativity about the future, and a constricted sense of 
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future time. Furthermore changes in the latter two variables were 
significantly correlated with changes in the severity of depression. 
Finally a number of studies have reported correlations between 
depression and the Beck Hopelessness Scale (Minkoffy Bergman, Beck, & 
Beck, 1973; Beck, Kovacs, & Weissman, 1975; Abramson, Garber, Edwards, 
& Seligman, 1978). 
Regarding logical errors in depressives, Rey, Silber, Savard, and 
Post (1978) reported that, in moderately and severely depressed 
patients, subtle disturbances in language syntax appeared to be as 
prominent as disturbances of language content and affective 
disturbances more typically associated with depression. These formal 
linguistic disturbances included logical errors identified by Beck; 
rigidity of thought, polarization or thinking in extranes, arbitrary 
interpretation of events, and magnification or minimization. 
Evidence for the existence of distinct depressive schemata which 
antedate or postdate the depressive syndrome, or for a unique 
contribution of schonata apart from the depressive mood and syndrome, 
is sparse. Hoehn-Hyde, Schlottman, and Rush (1982), for example, 
COTipared how depressed, nondepressed, and remitted depressed subjects 
interpreted self-directed social interactions. Œhey found that 
depressed differed from nondepressed subjects in the expected 
direction, but there were no differences in the interpretations of 
nondepressed and remitted depressed subjects. Coyne and Gotlib 
(1983), reviewing the literature regarding the role of cognition in 
depression, state that it is "difficult to distinguish empirically a 
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hypothesis concerning latent cognitive factors from the traditional 
assumption that when confronted with certain internal and external 
stimuli, some people become depressed, and negative thinking is siitply 
one characteristic of this state. Relevant data have not yet been 
identified" (p. 499). 
In summary, ample data exist to suggest that depressives are 
likely to experience Beck's "cognitive triad" of negativity concerning 
oneself, one's world, and one's future. In addition some evidence 
exists in support of the notion of erroneous thought processes among 
the depressed, although specificity to depression, has not been 
established. However the data do not yet support the notion of 
preexisting schemata which are inappropriately evoked in the 
depressed, and which lead to progressively more negative and more 
distorted interpretations of events. 
Extensions to Person Perception 
Although Beck's model makes no explicit predictions about how 
depressives perceive others, one might logically wonder whether the 
pervasive negative set specified ty the model extends also to this 
arena. In other words, do depressives see others in a negative light 
and do they distort perceptions of others' behavior negatively? 
Pietromonaco and Markus (1985) asked mildly depressed and nondepressed 
subjects to image, recall, and make inferences about a variety of 
events (h^^/sad, ànd social/nonsocial) while thinking about 
themselves or another person. They found that the negativity in 
thought which accompanies depression is restricted to thoughts about 
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oneself and does not generalize to thoughts about others. 
On the other hand, Beck (1967) suggested that the depressed 
contrast themselves unfavorably with others. Perceived 
dissimilarities, then, may be instrumental in maintaining the 
depressive's negative view of self. Lobitz and Post (1979) found that 
depressed subjects gave others significantly more rewards, had higher 
expectations of others, and evaluated others more positively than 
themselves, as compared with nondepressed subjects. However, there 
were no differences between the two groups' objective performances on 
the experimental tasks (word association, WAIS Digit Symbol, and a 
ward decisionr-making task). 
These findings parallel those of Shrauger and Terbovic (1976) 
regarding persons with low self-esteem. Shrauger and Terbovic had 
high self-esteem and low self-esteem subjects perform a concept 
formation task and evaluate their own performance. One week later 
they either reevaluated their cwn videotaped performance or evaluated 
a videotape of a confederate identified as another subject in the 
experiment. Iftiknown to the subject doing the evaluation, the 
confederate's performance mirrored that of their own videotaped 
performance. The authors found that the two groups did not differ in 
their actual performance on the task, but high self-esteem subjects 
rated their performance more positively than low self-esteem subjects. 
On the videotape assessment, the two groups' evaluations did not 
differ when they thought they were assessing another's performance but 
differed in the expected direction when th^ thought they were 
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assessing their own. 
In a related experiment Sharp and Tennen (1983) had depressed 
nonanxiouSf nondepressed anxiousr and nondepressed nonanxious subjects 
individually perform a cooperative puzzle-solving task together with a 
confederate. The confederate matched the performance of the subject 
by fitting puzzle parts of the same number and size as the confederate 
on each trial. After five trials, the experimenter told the pair that 
they had failed the task. Subjects were then asked to assign 
responsibility for the failure to self, other and/or the situation. 
Ohe authors reported that the tendency to assign blame to self was 
higher for the depressives than for the other two groups. In 
addition, the tendency to assign responsibility to the situation was 
lower for the depressives than for the other two groups. The authors 
concluded that self-blame ^ ong the depressed group was associated 
with faulty cue perception regarding the identical performance of the 
confederate. An interesting extension of this finding would be to 
explore whether the faulty cue perception is limited only to failure 
situations or applies also to successes, and whether the perception of 
cues about the behavior of others relative to oneself varies with the 
success or failure of the other. 
In summary t±e data indicate t±at depressed persons do not, in 
general, differ from nondepressed persons in their cognitions about 
others. It is only #ien sane self-reference or social comparison 
treatment is added that a difference emerges, with the depressed 
perceiving others in a more positive light than the nondepressed, as 
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compared to oneself. Although this is not explicitly predicted in 
Beck's model, it may be seen as a logical extension of the model. 
Ohe Revised Learned Helplessness Model of Depression 
The Initial Expression of the Model 
While Beck's model was built primarily upon clinical 
observations, the learned helplessness model and its subsequent 
revision have remained much more closely tied to the experimental lab. 
The model had its basis in the observation (Seligman & Maier, 1967) 
that animals, after a certain operant conditioning treatment, 
resembled depressed humans in their behavior, Seligman and Maier 
(1967) reported that harnessed dogs which were exposed to inescapable 
electric shock did not attempt to escape seven days later when they 
were unharnessed and exposed to escapable shock. Instead, after 
whining, urinating, and running frantically about the shuttlebox for a 
short time, the dogs sinply lay down, gave up and passively accepted 
the shock. They had "learned" in the harnessed condition that they 
were "helpless" to escape or eliminate the shock. Consequently they 
demonstrated the maladaptive failure to initiate responses typical of 
depressed persons (Seligman, Maier, & Geer, 1968). 
The phenomenon was not new, and had already been noted in rats, 
cats, fish, mice and humans (cf. Mowrer, 1940; MacDonald, 1946). 
However Seligman was apparently the first to popularize the 
experimental paradigm as a potential model for human depression and 
its treatment. Seligman (1972) outlined three sequelae of learned 
helplessness; lowered response initiation, retardation of subsequent 
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adaptive learning, and emotional distress. He noted that only one 
treatment seemed to alleviate these motivational, behavioral and 
emotional problems in dogs; to forcibly expose the dog "to the fact 
that responding produces reinforcement" (p. 410), thus changing the 
dog's ejçectations. Selign?an called this "directive therapy." 
An early attendît to articulate the model as it applied to humans 
focused on depressed vs. nondepressed subjects' perceptions of 
reinforcement on chance vs. skill tasks (Miller & Seligman, 1973). 
lUie hypotheses of the authors were confirmed when nondepressed 
subjects showed greater expectancy changes than depressed subjects in 
skill tasks, while the changes of depressed and nondepressed subjects 
were similar in chance tasks. Almost imperceptibly the emphasis in 
the model shifted to a cognitive deficit; the failure of depressives 
to perceive response-outcome associations, and the subsequent lowering 
of expectations of efficacy. Miller and Seligman later reported 
(1975) that learned helplessness resulted in poorer problem-solving 
behavior, confirming depressives' expectations and completing a 
vicious circle. 
At this point helplessness was thought of as a correlate of 
external locus of control (cf. Rotter, 1966). Several studies 
(Calhoun, Cheney, & Dawes, 1974; Abramcwitz, 1969; Miller & Seligman, 
1973) demonstrated positive correlations between depression and degree 
of externality. In addition helplessness in a single situation was 
reported to generalize easily across situations, iirpairing a broad 
range of behaviors. Learned helplessness was thus conceptualized as 
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trait-like (Hiroto & Selignan, 1975). "Unlearning" helplessness 
through exposure to tasks whose outcomes could be controlled reversed 
the perception of response-reinforcement independence and iirproved 
performance on subsequent tasks. 
However the notion of helplessness as a trait related to external 
locus of control was incongruous with reports of depressives assuming 
personal responsibility for outcomes, especially in failure 
situations. On this issue the learned helplessness model seemed in 
conflict with Beck's cognitive model. Abramson and Sackheim (1976) 
reviewed the literature regarding uncontrollability and self-blame in 
depression, and concluded that the data supported both positions. 
Th^ proposed that a cognitive paradox existed in depressives, and 
perhaps in normals too, with persons accepting responsibility for 
outcomes over which they perceived no control. 
Clearly the learned helplessness paradigm was in a state of 
crisis and in need of reformulation. In 1978, Abramson, Seligman and 
Teasdale staked out a new position. They criticized the old paradigm 
on two counts: it did not account for personal vs. universal 
helplessness (i.e., situations in which one is helpless and blames 
oneself because of one's distinctive deficits vs. situations in which 
anyone would be helpless), and it did not explain the chronicily or 
generalizability dimensions of helplessness in individuals. Iheir new 
paradigm ("the reformulated learned helplessness model") borrowed frcm 
an area of social psychology to correct these deficiencies : 
attribution theory. In so doing, the reformers made a conscious break 
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with animal analogs of helplessness. Ihey stated. 
Recently, investigators of human helplessness...have become 
increasingly disenchanted with the adequacy of theoretical 
constructs originating in animal helplessness for understanding 
helplessness in humans. And so have we. Wè now present an 
attributional framework that resolves several theoretical 
controversies about the effects of uncontrollability in humans. 
We do not know whether these considerations apply to infrahumans. 
(p. 50) 
In summary the learned helplessness model of depression was 
constructed around behavioral, motivational, and emotional 
similarities between animals which had been exposed to inescapable 
shock on the one hand and humans who were depressed on the other. 
Seligman proposed that treatments used to assist dogs in "unlearning" 
helplessness might prove beneficial in the treatment of human 
depressives. However, as the model was applied to humans, cognitive 
factors became progressively more important. îhe paradox of a 
simultaneous perception of uncontrollability and self-blame forced a 
reconceptualization of the model. The reformulated model was proposed 
to deal more successfully with the issues of 1) the perception of 
personal vs. universal helplessness and 2) cognitive/attributional 
factors affecting the duration and generalizability of depression 
across circumstances. The notion of a link with the jiiencmenon of 
animal helplessness was explicitly repudiated in the reformulated 
model. 
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After a brief introduction to attribution theory, we will return 
to specify the reformulation of the learned helplessness model 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). 
The Contribution of Attribution Theory 
There is no single attribution theory in the literature. Rather 
there are a number of theories relating to "the how and what of why" 
(McArthur, 1972). How people understand the causes of behavior—their 
own as well as others'—and what they understand those causes to be, 
is the substance of attribution theory. Kelley (1973) called 
attribution theory a type of "p^chological episteniology, " that is, a 
stu^ of the processes by which the person on the street understands 
the p^chological aspects of his/her world and how it operates. 
Similarly, Heider (1958) called attribution theory "naive p^chology, " 
that is, the stucfy of the "common sense psychology" people use in 
explaining the behaviors of others and of themselves. Attribution 
theory developed within social p^rchology because of its focus on the 
interpretation of other persons' behavior (Kelley, 1973). 
According to Lewin (1946) behavior is a function of the person 
and the environment (B = f (P, E)). If we hold the "B" constant in 
this equation, we can see that the larger the value of "P" in the 
equation, the smaller the value of "E" must be—and vice versa. In 
other words the person and the environment are inversely related as 
explanations of a given behavior. 
Heider, who is generally regarded as the founder of attribution 
theory, asserted that naive p^chologists operated with such an 
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implicit equation in attributing causes to behaviors (1958). His 
original formulation proposed that situational ("factors within the 
environment") and dispositional ("factors within the person") causes 
are inversely yoked together such that an increment in one necessarily 
accompanies a decrement in the other. Heider identified four causes 
which people employ in making attributions about achievement: 
ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck. Furthermore, he argued 
that in making causal attributions, individuals hold a condition 
responsible for an outcome if that condition is present when the 
outcome is present and absent when the outcome is absent. 
Kelley (1967) extended this line of reasoning with his 
"covariation principle." He proposed that the individual makes a 
causal attribution about a given behavior in a way vMch is similar to 
a scientist testing hypotheses by an experiment. However he expanded 
the number of causally relevant dimensions from two (person, 
environment) to three. An outcome in Kelly's theory may be caused by 
a person, an entity other than the person, or by a particular set 
of circumstances (i.e., by a time). In Kelley's theory, the 
information available to persons making attributions is classified as 
consensus information (regarding persons), distinctiveness information 
(regarding entities), and consistency information (regarding times). 
A couple of examples adapted from McArthur (1972, p. 174) will serve 
to illustrate how a naive p^chologist might use covariation 
information to determine which of these three sources of variation 
mi^t have caused an outcome. 
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Mary lauçpied at a comedian. Almost everyone who heard the 
cOTiedian laughed at him (consensus information). Mary does not 
laugh at almost any other comedian (distinctiveness information). 
In the past Mary has almost always lauded at this same comedian 
(consistency information). 
Using the covariation principle we would find that the "entity" (in 
this case, the comedian) is always present when the outcome occurs, so 
we would attribute Mary's laughter to the comedian. In this example 
the naive p^chologist would judge that the comedian caused Mary's 
laughter. But 
Paul lauded at a comedian. Hardly anyone who heard the comedian 
laughed at him (lew consensus). Paul also laughs at almost ai^ 
other comedian (low distinctiveness). In the past Paul has 
alw^s laucpied at this comedian (high consistency). 
Again, with reference to the covariation principle, we would find that 
the "person" (in this case, Paul) is always present when the outcome 
occurs, so we would attribute Paul's laughter to Paul himself, i.e., 
to seme disposition of Paul's. Keller (1967) also predicted that an 
"external attribution is made when evidence exists as to the (high) 
distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus of the appropriate 
effects" (p. 196). 
McArthur (1972) subjected Kelley's model to an empirical test 
with 87 male undergraduate subjects. In a 2x2x2 design, she varied 
consistency, consensus and distinctiveness information ("high" and 
"low" conditions) in 16 situations presented in written form. She 
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then had subjects make causal attributions about the outcomes and 
compared their attributions with those of a control group to whom 
only the outcome, with no information on which to base a covariation 
analysis, had been presented. She found unequivocal support for the 
model. 
Hewstone and Jaspars (1983) replicated McArthur's findings, 
noting that consensus information took on additional importance in 
determining attributions when the actors in the vignettes ("persons") 
were similar to the other persons involved in the vignettes 
("entities"). The importance of this will becone evident when we 
review person perception in depressed and nondepressed individuals, 
below. 
Weiner and his colleagues took the process one step further and 
looked at the consequences of causal attributions. Weiner et al. 
(1971) demonstrated that expectancies about future task performance 
depended on whether recent outcomes were attributed to stable 
(ability, task difficulty) or unstable (effort, luck) factors. Ihe 
stability of a cause referred to its fluctuation over time. 
Attributions to unstable causes produced lesser decrements in the 
expectancy of success following failure experiences than attributions 
to stable causes. Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, and Cook (1972) 
maintained that affective reactions to successful or unsuccessful task 
performance depended on whether one's performance was attributed to 
internal (ability, effort) or external (task difficulty, luck) 
factors. Previous research (Lanzetta & Hanna, 1969; Levinthal & 
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Michaels, 1971; Weiner & Kukla, 1970) suggested that pride in success 
and shame in failure situations was maximized by these internal 
attributions. In their experiment Weiner et al. had subjects reward 
or punish themselves by taking or giving back tokens after working on 
puzzles. Internal attributions magnified relative reward for success 
and punishment for failure at these achievement-related tasks. 
In summary, attribution theory provided fruitful ground for 
resolving the problems and extending the model of learned helplessness 
in a reformulation of that theory. Kelley constructed a well-
articulated framework to explain how individuals made attributions to 
persons, external entities, or novel situations, and McArthur provided 
ample empirical suK»rt for the framework. Weiner explored the 
effects of internality and stability attributions, and showed how the 
former are related to affect and the latter to expectations of 
efficacy. 
The Revision of the Learned Helplessness Model 
In applying the learned helplessness model to humans, cognitive 
variables were required to account for several theoretical 
discrepancies, as discussed above. Learned helplessness theorists 
presented a revised version of the (diencmenon in humans, which relied 
upon attributional variables to resolve the discrepancies in the 
former model. In the reformulation of the learned helplessness model 
Abramson, Seligman,'and Teasdale (1978) proposed that the following 
flow of events led to syirptons of helplessness; first, the individual 
is exposed to a situation where outcomes are independent of responses. 
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Second, the person perceives the present and past noncontingency of 
outcomes and responses. Biird, the person makes attributions about 
this noncontingency. Fourth, the person expects future 
noncontingency. And finally, symptoms of helplessness are manifested 
(p. 52). The major conçonent of this reformulation appears to be the 
interposition of attributions between the perception of noncontingency 
and the expectation of future noncontingency. All the other elements 
were present in the original formulation. 
The authors proposed that causal attributions in situations of 
perceived helplessness are made along three dimensions : 
internality/extëmality, stability/instability, and 
globality/specificity. We will examine each of these dimensions 
individually and then summarize their meanings as components of the 
reformulated learned helplessness model. 
Internality/Externality. Ihe first dimension involves the 
degree to which the helpless person believes that relevant others 
would also be helpless in a similar situation. Abramson et al. 
pointed out that one could be helpless in a situation where everyone 
would be helpless, such as a natural disaster. If this is perceived, 
then no internal attributions would be made. Furthermore one could be 
helpless in a situation where only nonrelevant others would not be 
helpless, such as a third grader attempting to solve a calculus 
problem. Similarly, no internal attributions would be made in this 
situation. Internal attributions would be made only in cases where a 
relevant other had controlling responses in his repertoire, such as 
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the case with the student who, in spite of his efforts, is the only 
one to fail a course. 
In a footnote (p. 53) the authors note the similarity of this 
dimension to that proposed by Heider and Kelley. However they state 
that whereas Heider and Kelly's internal/external dimension refers to 
whether a cause is located "within the skin" or "outside the skin," 
their own internal/external dimension refers to whether the individual 
is uniquely helpless or whether other persons would also be helpless. 
Nevertheless Abramson et al. recognized that "Heider and Kelley also 
rely on social comparison as a major determinant of internality" (p. 
54). 
Finally, the authors also distinguished internality in their 
model from internal ity as employed by Weiner. Weiner's work focused 
on attributions regarding success and failure, they stated, while 
their own attention focused on attributions regarding helplessness. 
To illustrate the difference, Abramson et al. cited evidence that 
uncontrollable positive events (i.e., situations of helplessness which 
would not be perceived as failures) also produce motivational and 
cognitive deficits in animals and humans, but probably not sad affect. 
However they referred to a since-published stu(fy (Abramson, 
Alley, & Rosoff, 1981) which demonstrated that uncontrollability was 
more difficult to perceive when one is winning than when one is 
losing. This fact would make the empirical difference between 
Weiner's and their own use of internality negligible, it would seem. 
In addition, parallel to Weiner's claim, Abramson et al. assert 
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that the intemality/extemality dimension is determinative of self-
esteem loss in situations of helplessness. If, through a process of 
social comparison, an individual in a helpless situation determines 
that relevant others would possess the behavioral repertoires needed 
to achieve response-outcome contingency, lower self-esteem will 
result. (One can only presume that this analysis would not apply in 
situations of uncontrollable positive events! In a later stucty 
Abramson, Garber, and Seligman (1980) state, "Only those cases in 
which the expectation of response-outcome independence is about the 
lack or loss of a highly desired outcome or about the occurrence of a 
highly aversive outcane are sufficient for the emotional component [of 
lowered self-esteem]" (p. 108).) 
Stabilitv/lnstabilitv. The second attributional dimension 
employed by the reformulated model is stability/instability. This 
dimension was proposed to account for the chronicity of helplessness. 
In the old model remission of helplessness was explained as 
interference from prior or later learning (Seligman, 1975). In the 
reformulated model the stability of the cause to which the 
helplessness is attributed was thought to mediate expectations about 
future helplessness, and therefore to mediate the duration of the 
syirptoms. 
Again, Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) recognized the 
similarity between their own formulation and that of Weiner and his 
colleagues. However they criticized Weiner's four causes of ability, 
luck, task difficulty and effort as insufficient to tap into the four 
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combinations of the causal dimensions of internality/externality and 
stability/instability. For exairple they stated that an internal, 
stable cause of helplessness need not be lack of ability, nor does an 
external, unstable cause necessarily need to be luck. In addition 
Abramson et al. maintained that a further refinement of Woiner's 
dimensions was needed—namely, a third dimension. 
Globalitv/Specificity. %e third attributional dimension 
proposed by Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) to account for 
human helplessness was that of globality/specificity. The old model 
did not require the inappropriate generalization of helplessness to 
new situations, nor did it offer a framework for predicting when such 
a generalization would occur. According to the reformulation, 
however, the generalization of helplessness was mediated by the 
specificity of the cause to which it was attributed. "A global 
attribution implies that helplessness will occur across situations, 
whereas a specific attribution implies helplessness only in the 
original situation" (p. 57). 
A final aspect of the 0ienanenon of helplessness which Abramson, 
Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) accounted for in their reformulation was 
its severity or intensity. proposed that the intensity of the 
motivational and cognitive deficits in helplessness were mediated by 
the strength or certainty of t±e expectation of noncontingency. In 
addition the intensity of affective changes would increase wit± both 
t±e certainty and t±e importance of the event the person is helpless 
about. 
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Summary and implications Qi the model for depression. In 
summaryf the reformulation of the learned helplessness model appears 
to have profited greatly from the work of Heider, Kelley, and Weiner 
regarding attribution theory. What was unique about the reformulation 
was the interposing of attributions between the perception of 
helplessness and the expectation of future helplessness. Biree 
attributional dimensions were proposed to account for the affective 
changes in helplessness, as well as the chronicity and 
generalizability of helplessness. These dimensions were internality, 
stability, and globality. Internality was seen as determined through 
a process of social comparison similar to Heider*s covariation 
principle. Internality and stability were proposed to account for 
affective and expectancy changes in a way similar to that proposed by 
Weiner. In tJie years following t±ie reformulation t±e differences 
between t±e use of t±ese dimensions in helplessness t±eory and their 
original meaning in attribution theory have not been iirportant, as we 
shall see. 
In closing, Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) apply their 
reformulated learned helplessness model directly to human depression. 
%ey suggested that depressed persons are those who adopt an 
attributional style which predisposes them to depression in situations 
of helplessness. Bie style was that of attributing failure or 
negative outcomes to internal, stable, and global causes. %ey 
pointed out t±at this notion resolves the discrepancy beta^een their 
own model of depression and that of Beck. Such a depressive 
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attributional style would explain Beck's findings regarding 
depressives' self-blame (internal attributions), their tendency to 
overgeneralize and inappropriately apply negative schemata in 
interpreting reality (global attributions), and depression proneness 
(stable attributions). Depression, then, is seen as a subset of 
helplessness 0ienanena in which the helpless person makes a particular 
set of attributions regarding the helplessness. 
But what do the authors do with the previously reported 
correlations between depression and externality? In a footnote, they 
explain that the correlations, though significant, were never strong. 
Furthermore they assert that "the external items [on Rotter's scale] 
are also rated more (tysphoric and the correlation may be an artifact" 
(p. 66). 
Empirical Considerations 
Since the publication of the reformulated learned helplessness 
model, the attention of researchers seems to have shifted from 
helplessness per se to depression. Seligman, Abramson, Semmel and von 
Baeyer (1979) reported that depressed college students, compared to 
nondepressed college students, attributed failures more internally, 
stably, and globally. Bie authors also reported a weaker but 
significant correlation between depression and a tendency to attribute 
success externally and unstably (but not specifically). Zemore and 
Johansen (1980) also found that depressed persons tended to exhibit 
internal, global and stable attributions for failure, and that the 
more failure on a word association task was attributed to lack of 
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ability (i.e., internally), the greater the depressive affect 
(measured by the Depression Adjective Check List—DACL—Lubin, 1981) 
following the task. However the predicted relationship between 
attributional style and performance on a subsequent anagrams task 
failed to emerge. Golin, Sweeney, and Shaeffer (1981), using a cross-
lagged panel analysis, reported that stability and globality (but not 
intemality) predicted depression scores one month later. Zuroff 
(1981) reported that depressives attributed failure relatively more 
internally than nondepressives, but in absolute terms their 
attributions were external. He found no difference between depressed 
and nondepressed subjects on attributions for success. Metalsky, 
Abramson, Seligman, Semmel, and Peterson (1982) found that college 
students with an internal or global attributional style at Time 1 in a 
prospective design experienced a depressive mood response (measured 
with the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List—MAACL—Zuckerman & 
Lubin, 1965) following receipt of a lew midterm grade, whereas 
students with an external or specific attributional style for negative 
outcomes at Time 1 were invulnerable to this depressive mood response 
to a low grade. However, stability of attributions was not correlated 
with mood following the receipt of the grade. In a stucty exploring 
the development of attributional style witJiin t±e family context, 
Seligman and Peterson (1983) found that nine-to-eleven-year-old 
childrens' attributional styles correlated significantJLy with 
their mothers' attributional styles, with their own synptoms of 
depression, and with their mothers' syirptans of depression. 
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Correlations between the children and their fathers were not 
significant. 
In a review of the literature regarding the role of cognition in 
depression, Coyne and Gotlib (1983) concluded that, "taken together, 
studies of attributions for success and failure suH»rt the hypothesis 
that depressed persons are more internal than are nondepressed persons 
in their attributions for failure...[but] Wien one examines the 
results of these studies for attributional dimensions other than 
internal-external, [the hypotheses] have tended not to be supported" 
(p. 486). Peterson, Villanova, and Raps (1985) reviewed the 
literature with the goal of identifying factors responsible for 
inconsistent results in testing hypotheses regarding attributional 
styles. A comprehensive search of the literature revealed that there 
were 61 relevant studies. Of those reporting on the relevant 
attributional dimensions in failure situations among depressives, 53% 
evidenced support for intemality, 46% for stability, 78% for 
globality, and 74% for the composite (linear combination of 
internality, stability, and globality). The authors were not able to 
identify any critical factors distinguishing supportive from 
nonsupportive studies with respect to the internality dimension. 
However, with respect to stability, sample size (mean N of 151 for 
supportive vs. 78 for nonsupportdve studies), number of events sampled 
(5.8 for supportive vs. 2.9 for nonsupportive), and t±e sampling of 
hypothetical events (74% of supportive studies vs. 13% of 
nonsupportive studies) were identified as critical factors. With 
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respect to globality, sample size (means of 138 vs. 73), number of 
events sampled (5.6 vs. 3.5), and hypothetical events (67% vs. 19%) 
were also identified as critical factors. Similarly, for the 
ccmposite style sample size (134 vs. 69), number of events (6.9 vs. 
3.2), and hypothetical events (78% vs. 15%) were again identified as 
critical factors. Interestingly, support vs. nonsupport of the model 
did not depend on sample type (students vs. patients), method of 
assessing depression (diagnosis vs. questionnaire), or whether the 
events assessed were immediate, recalled, or even the same across 
subjects. 
In response to criticism that depressives may not make 
attributions unless they are asked to do so by an experimenter, 
Peterson, Luborsky, and Seligman (1983) analyzed tapes of the 
psychotherapy of a depressed patient. Through an elaborate scoring 
method using four judges, the authors found that causal statements for 
internality, stability and globality were all predictive of mood 
shifts in the patient. Similarly Weiner (1985), reviewing the 
literature regarding spontaneous causal thinking, concluded, "there is 
unequivocal documentation of attributional activity, with unejçected 
events and nonattainment of a goal among the antecedent cues that 
elicit causal search" (p. 74). 
Alloy, Peterson, Abramson, and Seligman (1984) explored the 
hypothesis that globality of attributions predicts the generalization 
of helplessness from one situation to another. Dividing subjects into 
those with global vs. those with specific attributional styles 
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(measured by the Attributional Style Questionnaire—ASQ—Peterson^ 
Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalslq^, & Seligman, 1982) they exposed 
them to a pretreatment involving either controllable noise, 
uncontrollable noise, or no noise. In Experiment 1 the subjects were 
then exposed to a similar test situation. No relationship was found 
between attributional style and helplessness deficits (as predicted). 
In Experiment 2 the same subjects were exposed to a dissimilar test 
situation. The subject group with a global attributional style showed 
significantly more helplessness deficits than those with a specific 
style. This experiment represents a return to the original focus of 
the model on helplessness, and also demonstrates the continued 
liveliness of the model. 
In a recent review of the literature Peterson and Seligman (1984) 
examined cross-sectional correlational studies, experiments of nature, 
laboratory experiments and case studies related to the reformulated 
learned helplessness model. Ihey conclude that all these sources of 
information converge to provide ample empirical support for the model. 
In summary, the reformulated learned helplessness model has been 
subjected to about seven years' of empirical tests at this writing. 
Although the data do not support all aspects of the model in a 
consistent way, enough support has been found to warrant continued 
exploration of the model. In general the evidence is stronger in 
depression studies for the inportance of the internality dimension 
than the dimensions of stability or globality. Secondly, failure to 
find that depressives inevitably make internal attributions following 
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failure has led to the development of a "weak prediction^" that 
depressives are internal relative to nondepressives following failure. 
In other words, depressives may not actually attribute failure 
internally—but they will be more internal than nondepressives 
following failure. Ohis has received support when the "strong 
prediction," of internality in an absolute sense following failure, 
has not (cf. Zuroff, 1981). And third, the attributional style of 
depressives for failure is more distinct than their attributional 
style for success, as compared to nondepressives. The model continues 
to be a lively source of research hypotheses. 
Extensions to Person Perception 
Although the reformulated learned helplessness model makes no 
explicit predictions about depressives and person perception, the 
model does depend on the effects of social comparison to determine the 
internality of an attribution. In order to make an internal 
attribution, one must determine that relevant others would not be 
helpless (i.e., that they would possess the necessary behavioral 
repertoire to achieve response-outcome contingency in the situation). 
Sweeney, Shaeffer, and Golin (1982) hypothesized that depressives 
would not differ from nondepressives in attributional styles regarding 
others. Using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI—Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and the Multiple Affect Adjective 
Check List (MAACL) as dual criteria, the authors selected 20 depressed 
and 20 nondepressed undergraduate students as subjects. %ey 
administered the Attribution Style Questionnaire (ASQ) to them in two 
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forms. One was designed to measure causal attributions regarding 12 
self-referenced situations (six positive and six negative), and the 
other was modified to measure causal attributions regarding 12 
situations which applied to "a common target person." The order of 
the questionnaires was counterbalanced. Using the ASQ composite 
measure of internal, stable, and global attributions, Sweeney et al. 
found that the depressed group differed significantly from the 
nondepressed group in the expected direction on the self-referenced, 
negative-outcome vignettes. They found no differences between the 
depressed and nondepressed subjects regarding attributions about the 
target person, as predicted. Regrettably, the authors do not disclose ' 
who this target person was. %e iirportance of perceived similarities 
between the observer and the target of attributions will be ençAiasized 
in a later section of this study. 
Alternatively, one might argue that if depressives blamed others 
for the negative outcomes which occur to others then social comparison 
information would tend to conflict with their own attributional style 
of internality. %is argument suggests that, if depressives are 
placed in a social comparison situation (vAiich is an element cruci^ 
to the model), results might be obtained which differ from those of 
Sweeney, Schaeffer, and Golin regarding attributions about others. In 
fact this was the case with the Sharp and Tennen (1983) stu(fy in which 
depressives ignored consensus cues and tended to blame themselves for 
failure (relative to the nondepressed subjects) rather than a 
confederate whose performance mirrored their own. Nondepressed 
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subjects in that experiment were apparently more able to pay attention 
to consensus information, as they tended to blame the situation for 
failure relative to the depressives. Ihese findings suggest that 
depressives do not process social comparison information in the same 
way that nondepressives do. %is cognitive defect can result in a 
faulty covariation analysis. 
The Sharp and Tennen (1983) stucty differed fron the Sweeney, 
Schaeffer and Golin (1982) stu^ in two important respects. First, 
self-blame was yoked to other-forgiveness in an inverse manner in the 
Sharp and Tannen investigation. Subjects made self-, situation-, or 
other-responsible judgments about an event in which both self and 
other had participated. Ihe dependent measure was a 15 cm. line which 
subjects were asked to divide into segments assigning responsibility 
to self, ot±er, or t±e situation. But in the Sweeney et al. 
investigation assignment of internality for failure to self was 
independent of assignment of internality to an ot±er. Second, in the 
Sharp and Tennen stu^, social comparison was made wit± a relevant 
other—another student. We were not told who the target person was in 
t±e Sweeney et al. stuc^. As mentioned above, this element is 
critical to the theory. ®ie conflicting information t±ese two studies 
provide about how depressives view ot±ers may be attributable to these 
inconsistencies. 
Furthermore if'nondepressed persons tend to make self-serving 
attributions which excuse themselves for failure while blaming others 
for negative outcomes occurring to others (and we shall see below that 
36 
they do)f the difference between depressives' and nondepressives* 
other-attributions would be magnified. This effect was mildly present 
in the Sweeney, Schaeffer, and Golin (1982) stu^r although it did not 
reach significance. Ihe effect may have been suppressed because 
depressed and nondepressed subjects did not differ in internality even 
for self-referenced attributions of success and failure in that study. 
In summary, the reformulated learned helplessness model makes no 
direct predictions about self vs. other attributions for outcomes, 
nhe single stu<^ Wiich has explored this dimension found no 
differences between depressed and nondepressed subjects in 
attributions about others. However the stucfy lacked a theoretically 
inportant social comparison treatment. 
Person Perception in Depressed and Nondepressed/Normal Populations 
Social psychological investigations of person perception in 
depressed and nondepressed/normal populations do not fit neatly under 
a single paradigm. Rather, there appear to be three theoretical 
thrusts to the experimentation in this field, with overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting findings. Bie three research thrusts which will 
be considered in this section are social conparison (including 
downward comparison and the false consensus effect), actor-observer 
bias (including self-serving and self-effacing attributional styles), 
and schema-driven perceptions of others. Finally an attempt will be 
made to integrate and summarize these findings and their implications 
for how depressed and nondepressed persons differ in their social 
cognition. 
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Social Comparison Theory 
Leon Festinger set forth in 1954 a cortprehensive theory of social 
comparison, which explained the motivations and mechanisms by vrfiich a 
person uses other people as clarifiers, evaluators, shapers and 
modifiers of his/her opinions and abilities. Festinger described the 
primary motivation underlying these social behaviors in his first 
hypothesis, as follows: "There exists, in the human organism, a drive 
to evaluate his opinions and abilities" (p. 117). Goethals, Darley, & 
Kriss (1978) have suggested that this drive for self-evaluation may be 
subsumed under the attribution theory notion (cf. Kelley, 1967, 1973) 
that people desire an understanding of the causal relationships in 
their environment. As in attribution theory, one gains evaluative 
information in social comparison theory by matching oneself with 
relevant others—people of similar opinions and abilities. 
Festinger further hypothesized that "there is a unidirectional 
upward drive in the case of abilities..." (1954, p. 124). In other 
words greater value is placed on having superior abilities, so that 
the hi^er the score on any measure of performance, the more desirable 
it is. GSiis creates competitive behavior to enhance one's superiority 
with regard to others. 
One can imagine situations in which the drive to evaluate oneself 
in conparison with others of similar abilities would be in conflict 
with the drive to enhance oneself with respect to the abilities of 
others. For example, suppose a certain psychologist applied for 
positions and received job offers from two universities. Pay and 
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other extrinsic benefits were equal in both situations. At the first 
' university r thou^, the psychologist would be perceived as a novice 
assistant professor in a well-known department of psychology. At the 
second university, s/he would be ranked as a respected associate 
professor in a relatively unknown department of counselor education. 
Does social comparison theory predict t±at evaluation needs would lead 
hin/her to the more similar psychology department or would enhancement 
needs lead her to the less similar counselor education department? 
This dilemma has been addressed in social comparison literature by a 
theory of "downward comparison," which will now be explored. 
Downward Ccanparison. Wills (1981) recently reviewed the 
literature regarding downward comparison and made an explicit 
statement of the theory. In brief, the t±eory states that when a 
person is not in a state of subjective well-being, enhancement needs 
will take priority over evaluation needs. In ot±er words when a 
person is low in self-esteem, has experienced a loss of self-esteem, 
or is in a negative affective state such as feeling depressed, 
anxious, fearful or threatened, then that person will prefer social 
comparisons which are likely to restore self esteem, reduce anxiety, 
or alleviate depression. 
TVo recent studies dononstrated that downward comparison involves 
a biased search for information with the intent of enhancing the self, 
lyszczynski, Greenberg, and LaPrelle (1985) had subjects succeed or 
fail on a "social sensitivity test." The subjects were then given the 
opportunity to inspect up to 50 scored answer sheets from "previous 
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subjects." Consistent with the theory, subjects who failed the test 
requested more information when they expected it to reveal that most 
students performed poorly, while subjects who succeeded on the test 
were indifferent about seeking additional information regardless of 
their expectations about what it would reveal. Similarly Gibbons 
(1986) showed that depressed subjects whose moods had been tençorarily 
worsened preferred information from people who were also experiencing 
negative affect. In a second experiment Gibbons demonstrated that 
this information inç)roved the moods of depressed, but not 
nondepressed, subjects. 
The False Consensus Effect. Social comparison theory argues 
that people evaluate themselves by comparing themselves with relevant 
others. One way of comparing oneself with others might be by 
determining the number of people who share one's abilities or 
attributes, in order to estimate one's ranking on common dimensions. 
Thus, if a negative trait such as stubbornness is possessed by a large 
number of people, a person who possesses this trait might evaluate 
hin/herself less negatively than if relatively few people possess the 
trait. Similarly if only a few people possess a positive trait like 
affability, one might evaluate oneself more positively than if nearly 
everyone possessed the trait. 
Ross, Greene, and House (1977) discovered that people in general 
tend to overestimate the degree to which they are similar to others in 
attitudes, behaviors and traits. Biat is, they estimate a high 
consensus for the qualities th^ possess. Die authors introduced the 
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term "false consensus effect" to describe this jAiencmenon. Recently 
Sherman, Chassin, Presson, and Agostinelli (1984) reported that this 
effect is more marked when one compares oneself with positively-rated 
targets than with neutrally- or negatively-rated targets. Biese 
findings suggest that in general people employ false consensus 
information in a self-enhancing way. 
Tabachnik, Crocker, and Alloy (1983) reasoned "if self-
evaluations are derived in part from consensus information, that 
depressed people's self-evaluations are more negative than 
nondepressed people's suggests that their perceptions of consensus may 
differ from those of the general population" (p. 689). That is, 
indeed, what they found. 
In the Tabachnik, Crocker, and Alloy (1983) stu(ty, depressed and 
nondepressed college students were asked about the extent to which 
depression-relevant (hedonically negative), nondepression-relevant 
(hedonically positive), and depression-irrelevant (hedonically 
neutral) attributes were true of themselves and of the "average 
college student." The authors found less false consensus among 
depressed than nondepressed students, and a tendency for nondepressed 
students to enhance themselves relative to others. They discovered 
that the tendency for depressed students to depreciate themselves 
relative to others was a better predictor of severity of depression 
than their self-perceptions or their other-perceptions alone. 
Tabachnik et al. suggested that the low self-esteem which 
characterizes depressives may have its roots in the social comparison 
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process and suggested further research regarding differences in how 
depressed and nondepressed individuals differ in their perceptions of 
consensus information. 
In summary, depressed persons do not exhibit the social 
comparison processes which typify normal or nondepressed persons. 
Rather than engaging in evaluative cmparison with individuals or 
groups as close as possible to one's own, depressed persons tend to 
engage in "downward comparison" with those less fortunate than 
oneself. Normals, in fact, tend to find this aversive (cf. Strack & 
Coyne, 1983). Furthermore, rather than believing that one is more 
like others than one actually is, especially with regard to positive 
traits, depressed persons tend to depreciate themselves with regard to 
others and show no "false consensus effect." 
Actor-Observer Biases in Causal Attributions 
The second research thrust which will be considered involves 
actor-observer biases in making causal attributions. A substantial 
bo^ of literature has now accumulated which attests to consistent 
differences in the causal attributions one makes about one's own 
behavior (attributions about the observer) versus the behavior of 
others (attributions about an actor). As Jones and Nisbett (1972) 
reported, observers tend to explain their own behavior in terms of 
situational/external causes, while explaining the behavior of others 
in terms of dispositional causes internal to the actor. ïhese authors 
suggested three mechanisms which may be responsible for this 
discrepancy, noting that actors and observers differ in their visual 
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perspectives, their motivations in inferring the causes of behaviors, 
and the information available to them. 
Sources of the Bias. Storms (1973) investigated the 
hypothesis that visual perspective (and therefore an attentional and 
perceptual difference) was responsible for the discrepancy. According 
to this notion, actors cannot see themselves, so attribute their 
behavior more situationally while observers, whose visual field is 
engulfed by the actor, attribute the actor's behavior more 
dispositionally. through a series of live and videotaped observations 
of social interactions. Storms was able to isolate the variable of 
point-of-view on attributions made by and about actors and observers. 
The author found that attributional differences were mediated by 
perceptual orientation, that is, by the ^ ysical positions of actors 
relative to observers. Taylor and Fiske (1975) extended this finding, 
showing that focusing on a given individual in a social situation 
results in regarding that individual as more causative of the 
interactions than other individuals. Uhis effect was not related to 
differential retention of information about the individual on whom the 
attention was focused. The authors concluded that causes are often 
attributed to the most salient source of information. ®iis conclusion 
will be reached again later, when schenna-driven perceptions are 
examined. 
Eisen (1979) examined informational differences in the actor-
observer bias. Jones and Nisbett (1972) had originally reasoned that 
both actors and observers use Kelley's (1967) covariation principle in 
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making attributions. (The reader is referred to the discussion of 
Kelley's covariation principle beginning on page 19 of this paper.) 
However, actors are in a better position than observers to evaluate 
how consistent their behavior in a given situation is with past 
behaviors and how distinctive a given situation is in their 
experience. Observers, on the other hand, must rely more heavily on 
consensus information (how frequently others have been observed 
emitting similar behavior in a given situation) in making 
attributions. Eisen found that when these naturally-occurring 
differences were eliminated by giving subjects equal access to 
consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus information, actors' and 
observers' attributions converged. Interestingly, she found that 
actors reported positive behaviors as more consistent with their 
previous behaviors than did observers, while the reverse was true for 
negative behaviors. Accordingly, actors attributed positive behaviors 
more to their internal dispositions than did observers, while the 
reverse was true for negative behaviors. This suggested a 
motivational bias influencing estimates of the consistency of 
behaviors. 
This self-serving motivational bias has often been held 
responsible for differences in actor-observer attributions (Taylor & 
Koivumaki, 1976; Sicoly & Ross, 1977). Self-serving biases are found 
in two patterns : self-enhancing attributions are those in which 
actors attribute positive, socially desirable behaviors internally 
more than observers do; self-protective (or "defensive") attributions 
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are those in which actors attribute negative, socially undesirable 
behaviors externally more than observers do. Miller and Ross (1975), 
reviewing the literature on self-serving attributions, concluded that 
self-enhancing attributions were more clearly and consistently 
supported than defensive attributions. Zuckerman's (1979) review of 
the literature on both types of self-serving motives concluded that 
they remain lively explanations of actor-observer differences. 
However it may be difficult to distinguish empirically betweèn 
notions of motivational and informational bias in actor-observer 
attributional differences. Miller and Ross (1975) and Monson and 
Snyder (1977) have suggested that these two sources of bias are 
thoroughly interwoven. For example, actors may attribute desirable 
behaviors more internally because they selectively remember past 
instances of such behavior and therefore work with a distorted base of 
consistency information. However, we must resort to motivational 
theories to explain such selective remembering. Furthermore, as 
discussed above under the revised learned helplessness paradigm, 
people tend to perceive greater response-outcome contingency in cases 
of successful performance than in cases of failure. Uiis cognitive 
deficit may also lead to more internal attributions of successful 
behavior, and may have a motivational basis (Sicoly & Ross, 1977). 
In summary, three explanations have been offered for the 
commonly-observed gdienomenon of actor-observer attributional 
differences. First, perspectival differences may result in perceptual 
differences between actors and observers. The situation is figurai 
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(i.e., salient) for the actor, so s/he tends to attribute his/her 
behavior to these external causes. But the actor him/herself is 
figurai for the ctoserver, so the cfcserver tends to attribute the 
actor's behavior to dispositional causes within the actor. Second, 
differences in the information possessed by actors and observers has 
been held responsible for discrepancies in their attributions. Since 
actors have more access to consistency and distinctiveness 
information, thqr can rely on these sources in making attributions, 
while observers are confined to using mostly consensus information. 
Although informational differences can explain attributional 
discrepancies, they are not sufficient to explain the cooranonly-
encountered tendencies toward self-serving attributions made by actors 
as compared with observers. Œhese tendencies are best explained with 
reference to people's motivation to defend themselves against negative 
judgments or to enhance themselves. Evidence has been found to 
support all three explanations of the actor-observer bias: 
perceptual, informational and motivational. It is likely, then, that 
all three operate to unknown degrees and under unknown circumstances 
to produce the effect. 
Applications to Depression. It is perhaps not surprising that 
depressed persons' attributions do not reveal self-serving biases to 
the extent that normals' attributions do. Kuiper (1978) found that, 
while nondepressed subjects made external (defensive) attributions for 
failure, depressed subjects made internal (self-effacing) 
attributions. However both depressed and nondepressed subjects made 
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self-enhancing attributions for success in his stucty. Several other 
researchers have noted the absence of self-serving attributional 
biases in depression (e.g., Golin, Terrell, & Johnson, 1977; Golin, 
Terrell, Weitz, & Drost, 1977). 
Findings such as these have led depression researchers to the 
conclusion that in seme cases depressives distort information less 
than normals and therefore can be seen as "sadder but wiser," a phrase 
first applied by Alloy and Abramson (1979). Alloy and Abramson found 
that depressed subjects were surprisingly accurate in estimating the 
degree of response-outcome contingency on various tasks. Nondepressed 
subjects, on the other hand, overestimated the extent to which they 
were responsible for positive outcomes and underestimated the degree 
to which they were responsible for negative outcomes on the tasks. 
While researchers extending the original learned helplessness 
model of depression were interested in demonstrating that depressives 
were deficient in perceiving response-outcome contingencies, 
investigators were now finding the converse to be true in sane cases 
(cf. Abramson & Alley, 1981; Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981). 
Namely, nondepressives seemed to exhibit an "illusion of control" over 
objectively uncontrollable outcanes, while depressives were remarkably 
immune to these perceptual disturbances. Furthermore, Martin, 
Abramson, & Alloy (1984) investigated depressed and nondepressed 
perceptions of a confederate's control. They found that, in general, 
depressives tended to overestimate the confederate's control while 
nondepressives generally did not. Thus, nondepressives succumb to an 
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illusion of control for themselves but not for others, while 
depressives succumb to an illusion of control for others but not for 
themselves. 
Other evidence exists in support of the depressive "sadder but 
wiser" theme. Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, and Barton (1980) sought 
to separate the inpacts of two seemingly potent variables in 
depression; the social competencies of the depressed person (as 
perceived by others), and their self-perception (or "encoding") by the 
depressed individual. They reported the expected finding that 
depressives both see themselves and are seen by others as less 
socially competent than nondepressives. But unexpectedly, depressed 
persons' estimates of their social competence were more accurate 
(i.e., matched the judgments of others more closely) than the 
nondepressives. Lewinsohn et al. concluded that nondepressed persons 
demonstrated an "illusory warm glow" of self-perception which 
depressed persons lacked. 
Similarly Hoehn-Hyde, Schlottanan, and Rush (1982) asked depressed 
and nondepressed subjects to imagine videotaped social interactions 
being directed toward themselves or toward others. The depressed 
subjects rated the interactions more negatively than nondepressed 
subjects when they imagined than being directed toward themselves. 
Closer examination of the data, however, shewed that this finding was. 
due largely to the fact that nondepressed subjects responded 
differentially to the interactions, depending on whether they were 
imagined as being directed toward themselves or others. Nondepressed 
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subjects tended to evaluate interactions less negatively vrtien they 
were thought to be directed toward themselves. 
Finally GiWaons et al. (1985) demonstrated that increasing the 
negative mood of a group of psychiatric inpatients also increased the 
accuracy of the information th^ provided about their 
hospitalizations, of other self-report information, and of their 
descriptions of their problems. 
On a number of measures, then, the judgnents of depressed persons 
seem to be more accurate or veridical than those of nondepressed 
persons. Ihe attributions depressed persons make about their cwn and 
others' behavior do not show self-serving biases, depressives are more 
accurate in estimating the amount of response-outcome contingency than 
nondepressed persons, they lack the "illusory warm glow" of 
nondepressives, and persons experiencing a negative mood are more 
accurate in presenting self- and problem-relevant information than 
persons in whom such a mood is not induced. Regarding their 
perceptions of others, depressed persons are more likely to attribute 
control to others than are nondepressed persons. 
Schema-driven Person Perception 
%e third general research theme which will be reviewed, as 
applied to person perception, is that of schema-driven perceptions. 
Lewicki (1984) has drawn our attention to the importance of the self . 
in person perception. After inducing failure in a group of subjects, 
Lewicki demonstrated that their impressions of other people became 
biased by overestimating the general desirability of traits 
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corresponding to the subjects* own strong points. He concluded that 
"the self affects person perception and that even small situational 
changes in self-perception are capable of producing related specific 
changes in processing information about others" (p. 1190). 
A great deal of the research on the relation between self-
schemata and social information processing has been done by 
investigators who are interested in depressive cognition. Kuiper, 
Derry, and MacDonald (1982), for example, state that they use Beck's 
model as a theoretical framework to guide their research program 
integrating social cognition with clinical concerns. In accord with 
the model, they- define the self as a 
cognitive prototype, or schema, involved in the processing of 
personal and social information about one's self and others. As 
a hypothetical construct, a schema is said to consist of an 
organized cluster of stored knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions 
regarding aspects of the individual and his or her world. îhe 
content within each schema is built up and organized from an 
individual's day-to-day experiences and can be considered a 
framework, or "organized setting," against which the person bases 
perceptions and judgments concerning relevant information, (pp. 
79, 80) 
Kuiper and Derry (1981), congruent with the more general findings 
of Lewicki (1984) listed above, argued that the self-schema functioned 
to organize information about others in memory. %ey propose that a 
"contrast effect" exists in both depressives and nondepressives. 
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According to Kuiper and Derry, normals bask in an "illusory warm 
glowr" while tending to perceive others in a less flattering light. 
On the other hand depressives tend artificially to elevate positive 
attributes about others, heightening their own sense of inadequacy by 
comparison. 
Kuiper and MacDonald (1982) found that nondepressed subjects 
displayed a negative bias in recalling information about others, 
tending to enhance themselves while degrading others. Depressives 
also displayed a contrast effect, tending to degrade themselves while 
enhancing others. Wie contrast was not as marked among depressives as 
among nondepressives in their stucty. In their conclusion Kuiper and 
MacDonald argue for a self-consistency interpretation of their 
results, proposing that other-referent data are used to provide 
support for one's self-schema. Uhey point out that the "illusory warm 
glow" of nondepressives does not extend to otl:&rs. Rather, "it seems 
that normals may facilitate their own 'warm glow' by perceiving others 
in a negative manner" (p. 237). 
The notion of schema-driven perceptions (i.e., of perceptions 
"filtered through" and influenced by schemata) has been used to extend 
the perceptual explanation of actor-observer attributional 
differences. It was pointed out above that Taylor and Fiske (1975) 
demonstrated that causation was attributed to the most salient aspect 
of the attributor's field. In a subsequent stucfy, Fiske, Kenny, and 
Taylor (1982) proposed that salient stimuli attract attention (an 
attribute of the ctoserver) according to their relevance for the 
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observer's causal schemata. Schema-relevant information is encoded in 
more detail, which affects the observer's inferences about causality. 
According to Fiske et al., attributional biases depend only indirectly 
on salience; the relationship is mediated by schema-driven inferences 
about causality. "Thus, subjects' own conceptions of causally 
relevant evidence are the most sensitive predictors of their causal 
inferences" (p. 117). 
In explaining the notion of "causal schemata," Fiske, Kenny, and 
Taylor (1982) referred to "the rules for inferring social influence" 
(p. 116), but make no reference to self-schemata. It may only be 
inferred, then, that depressives may make causal attributions on the 
basis of unique causal schemata which, in turn, depend on their self-
schemata. 
In summary, researchers investigating the influence of self-
schemata on person perception have found that the two are linked 
correlationally, if not causally. Depressives and nondepressives 
exhibit a "contrast effect" regarding their perceptions of others, 
whereby th^ interpret information about others in such a way as to 
maintain their present level of self-esteem. Furthermore causal 
schemata, if not self-schemata, appear to pl%r an important role in 
making causal attributions about self and others. 
Integration gf Findings 
Biree main thrusts of person perception have been surveyed in 
this section, with ^ cial attention to the findings regarding 
depressed persons. Die social comparison literature reveals that. 
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while normals compare with similar others for evaluation purposes, 
depressives tend to oonçare downwardly, for enhancement of self-
esteem; and while normals tend to believe erroneously that others 
(especially esteemed others) are similar to themselves, depressives 
show no such "false consensus effect." This literature suggested that 
depressed persons may process consensus information differently than 
normals. Bie actor-observer attribution literature revealed that 
normals tend to manifest a self-serving bias in which they take credit 
for positive outcanes, but make external attributions for negative 
outcomes. Depressives showed no such biases; in fact they tended 
toward the opposite pattern of "self-effacing biases." Furthermore 
normals were subject to the "illusion of control," which led them to 
perceive response-outcome contingency where there was none. 
Depressives were under no such illusions, having been labeled by 
researchers as "sadder, but wiser." This theme of "depressive 
realism" extended also to judgnents of how subjects were perceived by 
others. While normals attributed an "illusory warm glow" to 
themselves, depressives were more accurate about how they were 
perceived. And finally, the literature regarding schema-driven 
perceptions of others evidenced a "contrast effect" for normals, in 
which they tended to recall more negative information about others 
than about thanselves. Depressives also manifested the "contrast 
effect," but in the opposite direction. 
In general, then, the social psychology literature presents an 
image of depressed persons as those who fail to exhibit a number of 
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esteem-enhancing biases about themselves and their relationships with 
others. It appears that normals buoy themselves up by distorting 
their social worlds in a number of ways. 
Overview of the Present Research 
Purpose 
ïhe present research has two purposes. First, the effects of 
performance outcome and consensus information on the attributional 
processes of depressed and nondepressed persons, relative to their cwn 
behaviors, will be explored. Expectations of depressed and 
nondepressed persons about the performance of others on an identical 
task will be compared. And second, the effects of consensus 
information on actor-observer attributional biases of depressed and 
normal subjects will be investigated. 
In reference to the first purpose, regarding the use of consensus 
cues, Sharp and Tënnen (1983) suggested that depressed persons do not 
use these cues when placed in failure situations with confederates 
performing similarly to them. Tabachnik, Crocker, and Alloy (1983) 
suggested that depressives construct consensus information differently 
than normals when asked to attribute various traits, feelings, and 
attitudes to themselves and others. Tabachnik et al. also suggested 
that depressive-normal differences be further explored by examining 
their respective perceptions of consensus about events. Schema-
driven theories of person perception would predict that depressives 
will tend to maintain self-depreciating attributions even in the face 
of conflicting consensus information. As Tabachnik et al. pointed 
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out, the tendency to self-depreciate relative to others may be a more 
inportant component in the development of depressive synptcms than 
sinply self-ratings alone. Accordingly, the present study will sample 
depressives' attributions both before and after being presented with 
consensus information. 
%e present stucfy was designed to extend the findings of Sharp 
and Tennen (1983) to include both success and failure for the <±»server 
and to include consensus information conveying either the success or 
the failure of relevant others. The present stu<^ also makes 
consensus information more reliable to the observer than was the case 
in the Sharp and Tennen stu<^, since the ctoserver may conpare self 
performance with that of an entire group of peers, rather than with a 
single individual. This provides a stronger test of the 
impermeability of depressive attributions to consensus information. 
Further, the outcome of others' performances will be made explicit and 
distinct from the outcome of the subject's performance in the present 
stu(fy. It is felt that this represents more accurately the real-life 
experiences of depressives. 
The second purpose of this stu^ relates to the effects of 
consensus information on actor-observer attributional biases in 
depressed and normal subjects. While self-depreciating and self-
serving biases, respectively, have been reported, no stu<fy to date has 
investigated whether receiving identical consensus information will 
tend to eliminate these differences. And while equalizing consistency 
and distinctiveness information tends to eliminate the actor-observer 
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bias in normals (Eisen, 1979), differences between normals and 
depressives can be explained^ as we have seen above, by discrepancies 
in estimating consensus data. Will attributions about others continue 
to be consistent with the r^rted biases after equalizing such 
information, or will they converge? 
The Sweeney, Shaeffer, and Golin (1982) study reported no 
differences between depressed and nondepressed persons' attributions 
about others, but this conflicts with the findings of other 
researchers as detailed above. Perhaps the discrepancy is due to the 
relevance of the targeted "other" about whom attributions were made in 
the Sweeney et àl. stu<fy. Social comparison, attribution, and revised 
learned helplessness theories all require that the target share 
salient characteristics with the attributor. Sweeney et al. failed to 
disclose information in their article about the target of subjects' 
attributions. 
Methodological Considerations 
Use of College Students in Depression Research. Depue and 
Monroe (1978) have correctly pointed out the pitfalls in using 
depressed college students selected with a self-reported depression 
measure (usually the Beck Depression Inventory; BDI—Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) in depression research. They point 
out that clinical manifestations of depression constitute 
heterogeneous groups, and that depressed college student subjects may 
differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively from these clinical 
populations. However Seligman (1978) pointed out that depressed 
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college students constitute a legitimate target of investigation, 
apart from the relevance of findings from this population for 
heterogeneous clinical populations. Furthermore Hammen (1980) found 
that, ijss weeks following the administration of the BDI to a college 
population, 47% of those scoring above 15 had diagnosable major or 
minor depressive disorders. Since BDI scores correlate highly with 
psychiatric estimates of depth of depression (i= .77; Bumberry, 
Oliver, & McClure, 1978), the instrument has been often been regarded 
as a measure of the intensity of depression-related symptoms, rather 
than diagnostic of a particular depressive syndrome (cf. Tabachnik, 
Crocker, & Alloy, 1983). 
However, LewinscAin and Teri (1982) recommend that another 
depression-related instrument be used in conjunction with the BDI to 
classify subjects because of the large number of false positives which 
the BDI yields. Oliver and Simmons (1984), for example, noted that if 
the typical BDI cut point of 9/10 is used to identiJ^ depressed 
subjects, t±e instrument yields a sensitivity of 100%, but a 
specificity of only 86%. The present research will anploy a state-
dependent depression measure, t±e Depression Adjective Check List, as 
a second screening instrument. 
Choice of Attribution-Generating Task. A second 
methodological problem plaguing research projects similar to that 
presented here is the choice of an appropriate attribution-generating 
task (Weiner, 1983). House (1983) has demonstrated that ego-involving 
tiasks are more likely to generate spontaneous attributions than non 
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ego-involving tasks. In other words, subjects must feel that they 
have something "at stake" in the task, and that the skills and 
abilities required by the task are relevant to their cwn goals. 
Accordingly, for college subjects, a verbal task has been selected for 
the present stu<ty. 
Weiner (1983) has suggested that anagram tasks are well suited to 
attributional research. Because this type of task is unfamiliar to 
most subjects, ambiguity is created as to the cause of the outcome. 
In addition, most subjects are unlikely to have social comparison 
information about their performance on these tasks, so feedback about 
others' successes or failures is more likely to be believable, no 
matter how well or poorly the subject performed. 
The anagrams will be divided into two lists; one list of easily-
solvable anagrams, and one list of difficult anagrams. %e anagrams 
will be selected from a list provided by Tresselt and Mayzner (1966). 
]3hey will be divided according to median solution time norms provided 
in the Tresselt and Mayzner stu(ty. 
Measurement of Attributions. A third methodological problem 
encountered in attributional research concerns the measurement of 
attributions. Several different approaches to the measurement of 
attributions are currently in use. Wéiner (e.g., 1974, 1980) asks 
subjects to rate the in^rtance of four causes (two of which are 
assumed to be internal, and two of which are assumed to be external) 
in determining the outcome. However, Krantz and Rude (1984) point out 
that these causes do not always represent the predicted causal 
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dimensions (intemality, stability) in the eyes of the attributor. 
Furthermore, restricting potential causes to four eliminates other 
spontaneous attributions and m^ result in a distorted picture of 
subjects' attributions (Miller, Shiith, & Uleman, 1981). 
Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, and Seligman 
(1982) have devised an instrument—the Attribution Style Questionnaire 
(ASQ)—^vMch minimizes these problems. %e ASQ first asks subjects to 
name the single most important causes of a series of hypothetical 
events. Bien, for each of the 16 events, the subject is asked to 
rate, on a seven-point Likert scale, the intemality, globality and 
stability of the cause. %e 64 resulting attributional dimension 
ratings are summed to produce an attributional style of internality, 
globality, and stability of attributions. 
But the present research investigates a single attributional 
dimension (internality) in response to a single, nonhypothetical 
event. Accordingly, only a single relevant Likert rating would be 
obtained for each subject. However single ratings of a single 
dimension have proven to be highly unreliable (I's ranging from .39 to 
only .42 in a test-retest stu(%r by Elig and Frieze (1979). 
Accordingly, the present research will use both the ASQ-type strategy 
and the Weiner-type strategy to assess t±e intemality of 
attributions. Krantz and Rude (1984) have shown that measurements of . 
causes and causal dimensions each make a unique contribution to the 
prediction of depression scores. 
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Ses Differences 1q Depression aM Attributional Stvle. 
Ejpidemiologically, depressive disorders are known to be more prevalent 
among females than among males (Weissman & Klerman, 1977). Sex 
differences have also been found in the responses of college 
undergraduates to the BDI. Hammen and Padesky (1977) reported that, 
although there was no difference in the depth of self-reported 
syirptoms on the BDI for their large sample of 1,300 women and 972 men, 
there were significant and interpretable differences in the patterns 
of synptom expression. Depressed men were more likely to report an 
inability to cry, loss of social interest, a sense of failure, and 
scxnatic complaints. Depressed women were more likely to report 
indecisiveness and self-dislike. Accordingly, male and female 
subjects selected by BDI cut points may be characterized by differing 
patterns of symptom expression. These, in turn, could confound the 
measurement of dependent variables in this stu(ty. 
Furthermore, sex-related differences in attributions have been 
reported, although not consistently. Eisen (1979) blocked subjects by 
sex in her stucfy of actor-observer differences, but found no main 
effect for sex. But House (1983), looking at self-presentation 
variables in making attributions, found that the correlations between 
depression and attributional style were in opposite directions for 
males and females when their attributions were made under the 
conspicuous observation of a peer. However these differences did not 
emerge in the nondDserved condition. Martin, Abramson, and Alley 
(1984) found that females' attributions of others' control in a task 
60 
resembled those of depressed (male and female) subjects—vMle 
nondepressed males' attributions did not. 
Deaux and Farris (1977) found that men and women both receive and 
make different attributions for the same task outcome. Pasguella, 
Mednick, and Murr^ (1981) reported that men empAasized ability 
attributions more than women, in general, but that women empdiasized 
ability more than men after failure outcomes, Reno (1981) found that 
males tended to attribute occupational success more to stable causes 
than did females. Yarkin, Town, and Wallston (1982) reported that 
both male and female observers tended to attribute success more to 
ability and less to effort and luck for male actors than for female 
actors. Finally, in a Japanese population. Banzai (1983) found that 
female cAjservers tended to attribute the failures of actors more 
externally than did male <±»servers. 
In the present stucty, then, attention will be given to the 
modifying effects which sex may have on subjects' attributions. 
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METHOD 
Design 
Ihe design was a 2x2x2 con^letely randomized factorial design 
(cf. Kirk, 1982, pp. 429 f.). Between-subjects factors were mood 
(depressed vs. nondepressed), task outcome (success vs. failure), and 
consensus information (feedback that peers succeeded vs. failed on the 
task). Sex was also utilized as a classification variable; sex was 
considered a potentially confounding variable for purposes of this 
stu(ty. The dependent measure of major interest was the 
internality/externality of causal attributions. These were measured 
both before and after the provision of consensus information. 
Attributions! targets were one's own performance, as well as that of 
one's peers. 
The three between-subj ects treatments of interest can be 
schematized in the following w^; 
DEPRESSED 
Fail I Succeed 
0 
T Fail 1 2 
H 
E 
R Succeed 3 4 
NONDEPRESSED 
Fail I Succeed 
0 
T Fail 5 6 
H 
E 
R Succeed 7 8 
The cells in the design are numbered for reference purposes 
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Instruments 
Beck Depression Inventory 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI—Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, 
& Erbaugh, 1961) is a 21-item self report inventory of depressive 
synptoms which has been used frequently in depression research. (See 
J^ppendix F.) Beck et al. (1961) reported a split-half reliability 
coefficient (with Spearman-Brcwn correction) of .93. Schaeffer et al. 
(1985) reported that the validity of the BDI (correlations with 
clinicians' ratings of severity of depression and with an overall 
depression score based on criteria from the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual cjf Mental Disorders (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 
1980)) surpassed that of the MMPI Depression Scale (Hathaway & 
McKinley, 1942) among a sample of 200 chemically dependent and 
psychiatric inpatients. Bumberry, Oliver, and McClure (1978) reported 
a correlation of .77 between BDI scores and a structured p^chiatric 
interview based upon the DSM-III. This coefficient surpassed t±e 
interrater reliability of psychiatric estimate, which was .62. Their 
sample consisted of 56 university undergraduates. Davies, Burrows, 
and Poynton (1975) reported a significant positive relationship 
between the BDI and other depression measures. Factor analyses of tJie 
BDI (Beck & Beamesderfer, 1974; Giambra, 1977) suggest that is 
primarily measures negative self-image, social withdrawal and 
somatization tendencies. 
A coefficient aljAia was calculated for the BDI, using the results 
of the 626 students who took the instrument during mass testings in 
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the present stu<ty. Coefficient aljAia was found to be .84, showing 
sufficient reliability for screening purposes. A distribution of 
students' scores on the BDI is presented in i^ipendix D. 
Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale 
Bie revised version of the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy 
Scale ky Eagly (1967) is a measure of global self-esteem. (The Janis-
Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale is ^ pendix G.) This is a revision 
of an earlier scale used extensively in persuasibility research 
(Hovland & Janis, 1959). The revised version contains 20 items, 
answered on a 5-point Likert scale and balanced for response set 
(Crandall, 1973). Eagly (1969) found split-half reliabilities of .72 
(1967) and .88 (1969) for two samples. Crandall (1973) summarized the 
scale's utility and presented good convergent (.84) and discriminant 
Cc's varied between -.36 and .14) validity. The scale has been used 
frequently in the social psychology literature and has shown itself to 
be a valid and reliable scale (Hamilton, 1971; Larsen & Schwendiman, 
1969; Skolnick & Shaw, 1970) in measuring the construct of self-
estean. It has also been used recently by Wilson and Krane (1980) in 
a study related to depression and self-estean. 
A coefficient alpiia was calculated for the Janis-Field, using the 
results of the 626 students who completed the instrument during the 
present mass testing. Coefficient aljiia was .88. Correlation between 
the Janis-Field and the BDI was calculated at .54 (p <.0001), 
indicating that 27% of the variability in depression, as measured ky 
the BDI in this sample, can be accounted for by low self-esteem, as 
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measured by the Janis-Field in this sanple. Hie frequency 
distribution of Janis-Field scores in this sairple is provided in 
i^jpendix D. 
Depression Miective Check List 
The Depression Adjective Check List (DACL—^Lubin, 1965) is a 
measure of the relatively transitory mood state of depression. (The 
DACL is i^çendix H.) Calhoun, Chen^, and Dawes (1974) reported a 
significant correlation between DACL scores and 44 female 
undergraduate students' tendency to hold themselves responsible for 
depressed mood. Post and Lobitz (1980) reported that DACL scores 
correlated more highly with consensual psychiatric diagnoses than 
scores on Zung's Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS—Zung, 1965) 
correlated with the diagnoses. Lubin, Roth, Dean, and Hornstra (1978) 
reported concurrent validities ranging to .77 for the DACL in a 
comparison with 14 other measures of depression, in a sample of normal 
adult females. Roth and Lubin (1981) reported two factors within the 
DACL, accounting for 34.7% of the variance. They labeled these 
factors, which correlated £= .21, "depressed mood" and "elevated 
mood." The KR-20 coefficient for the positive factor was .74, and for 
the negative factor .68. 
Lubin (1981) reported that the mean DACL score for a group of 
mental health center outpatients (Ij=24) with a diagnosis of "psychotic 
depressive reaction" was 16.8 (s.d. 9.3), while a group of "normal" 
students, predominantly college undergraduates (N=265), had a mean of 
8.1 (s.d. 5.4). 
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In the present stu(fy, the DACL was enployed as a second screen, 
serving as a state-related measure of depression. 
Dependent Measures 
Self-rating. After conç>leting the anagrams task (see below) 
subjects were asked to rate their performance on a dichotomous 
(success/failure) scale. (This scale is included in i^)pendix A.) 
This was intended as a check to assure that the manipulation of 
assigning subjects to success or failure conditions by varying the 
difficulty level of the anagrams was successful. 
Other-expectancy. Subjects were asked to estimate the 
percentage of peers in their group who a) performed better than they 
themselves did on the task, and who b) succeeded on the task. (The 
expectancy questions to which subjects responded are found in i^^>endix 
A.) Success was defined for the subjects as getting at least 50% of 
the anagrams correct. This level was chosen so that subjects in both 
the "fail" and "succeed" conditions could be given the same 
instructions about what represented success. A level higher than 50% 
would have made the construction of an anagram list which everyone 
"passed" more difficult, while a level lower than 50% would have posed 
similar difficulties in ensuring that everyone failed the designated 
list. 
Rating of causes of ssfli and others' performance—ore-consensus 
feedback. While the anagrams were being "scored," subjects were 
asked to write the one major cause of the outcome for self. Then they 
rated the internality of this cause on a seven-point Likert-type 
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scale. Finally they rated the iirportance of the causes of 
ability, effort, task difficulty, and chance/luck on seven-point 
Likert-type scales. After completing this information about their own 
outcomes, they were then asked to provide the same information 
about the outcomes of the majority of others in their group. Ratings 
regarding self and others were made on separate pages (see Appendix 
A). 
Rating of causes of own and others' performance—post-consensus 
feedback. After being told that approximately 60% of the students 
in t±eir group either succeeded or failed on the task, subjects were 
again asked to rate the impact of the four causes (ability, effort, 
task difficulty, and chance/luck) on the outcomes. As with the pre-
consensus feedback attributions, a single score for internality of 
causes was obtained by summing the external causes and subtracting the 
internal causes from them (task difficulty + chance/luck - (ability + 
effort)). This score was linearly combined with the internality rating 
of the single cause named by the subject. In this way the reliability 
of the internality rating was increased by incorporating five 
observations. Although separate analyses using each of the 
attributional items as a dependent measure may have provided some 
interesting information, this approach was not taken because of the 
sacrifice in reliability it would have involved. 
Since reliability was a goal, it was hoped that the most reliable 
subset of items could be used as t±e dependent measure of externality 
for each analysis of variance (ANOVA) vdiich was to be run. The most 
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reliable subset of each measure of attributions (i.e., regarding self 
and regarding others, both prior to and following the presentation of 
consensus feedback) was calculated and is displayed in i^pendix B. 
The approach outlined by Strahan (1980) was used to determine which 
composite of items posessed the highest coefficient algdia, and 
therefore the highest reliability. Regrettably, it was found that the 
most reliable subset of items did not consist of the same items in 
each case. Thus, pre-post comparisons and self-other catparisons 
could not be made because the subjects' scores were not comparable in 
these cases. Accordingly, all five items were used as the 
attributional measure for the stu^. As can be seen in i^jpendix B, 
the sacrifice in reliability vdiich results from using all five items, 
rather than the most reliable subset, is not great in most cases. 
Anagrams task. Anagrams tasks have a long history of use in 
attribution research (cf. Levine, 1966). In the present stu^, 
unknown to the subjects, there were two different lists of anagrams: 
an "easy" list, designed to provide the subject with a success 
experience; and a "hard" list, designed to provide the subject with a 
failure experience. Both lists (found in i^jpendix A) contained 20 
five-letter anagrams (scrambled words) for subjects to unscramble 
within five minutes. %e "easy" list contained 16 anagrams with 
median solution times established at less than ten seconds (Tresselt & 
Mayzner, 1966). The four remaining anagrams were unsolvable. Hie 
"hard" list contained 16 unsolvable anagrams, plus four solvable 
anagrams with median solution times ranging from ten to 30 seconds. 
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Both lists (see i^pendix A) contained instructions suggesting that 
there mi^t be a solution strategy vAiich could be employed as a 
template to speed solution time for the entire list. (There was no 
such template. Ihis instruction was given to heighten credibility for 
subjects in the failure condition who were told that the majority of 
their peers succeeded.) Subjects were thoroughly debriefed about the 
lists following the experiment. 
Procedure 
Subject Recruitment ang Selection 
Volunteer subjects were recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes at Iowa State University, consistent with Department and 
University policies and procedures for the use of human subjects in 
research. This research project proposal was examined and accorded 
approval by the Iowa State University Human Subjects Review Committee. 
A copy of the informed consent sheet presented to subjects as well as 
the Human Subjects Review Committee approval sheet are found in 
Appendix E. Subjects received extra course credit for participating 
in the experiment. (Two undergraduate research assistants were also 
recruited. The research assistants received academic credit for their 
participation.) 
In regularly-scheduled mass testing sessions, students were 
administered the BDI and the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale, 
Since internality is the dimension of interest, and since this 
dimension is theoretically related to self-esteem, a self-esteem 
measure (Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale) was employed as an 
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exploratory measure; it was not used for screening or experimental 
purposes. It was used to explore that part of the BDI variance which 
is shared with a measure of self-esteem. After filling out a consent 
form, students were also asked some questions relating to demographic 
variables on a face sheet; age, sex, and class. Students were told 
that persons with a wide range of scores on the various tests will be 
asked to participate in another experiment within the coming weeks. 
All experimental materials are displayed in i^çendix A. 
A dual criterion was employed in selecting depressed (DP) and 
nondepressed (NDP) students. The first criterion involved the BDI, 
and will now be discussed. (The second screen took place at the 
outset of the experiment itself, and will be discussed below.) Beck 
(1972) has proposed 9/10 (out of a total of 63 possible points) as the 
cut point for mildly depressed persons, and the majority of depression 
studies using the BDI with college students a£^ar to have employed 
this criterion. Beck has also proposed four as the upper limit for 
classification as nondepressed. Using this as a cut point is also a 
convention in the depression literature. Accordingly, the first 
screen consisted of contacting only those students who had scored four 
or less, or ten or more, on the BDI during mass testing. These 
students were asked to participate in the experiment itself. 
Bumberry, Oliver, and McClure (1978) stated that approximately 
23% of college students score at or above 10 on the BDI. In the 
present stu<fy, approximately 31% scored at or above 10. Accordingly, 
four separate mass testings were needed to secure the necessary 
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numbers of students. 
Bie experimental treatment was administered within one to six 
weeks following mass testing. Hatzenbuehler, Parpalf and Matthews 
(1983) indicate that classification as non-/ mildly, moderately, or 
severely depressed using the BDI tends to remain stable for at least 
one week, but then classifications m^ tend to deteriorate. Because 
of the time gap between the original administration of the BDI in mass 
testing and the subjects' participation in the actual experiment, a 
second, state-oriented depression screen (the DACL) was employed at 
the time of the experiment to assure that DP and NDP classifications 
remained accurate. 
Experimental Procedure 
For purposes of experimental administration subjects were divided 
into two groups, meeting in two separate classrooms, according to 
consensus feedback condition. Those receiving group failure consensus 
information met separately from those receiving group success 
consensus information. Depressed and nondepressed, self-failure and 
self-success subjects were distributed in both these classrooms. 
After filling out a consent form and the DACL, the anagram task 
was introduced. Subjects were told that it was a test of problem-
solving ability and that, for a successful performance, they should 
solve at least half of the anagrams. Subjects were instructed not to 
confer with one another about the task or about how they perform on 
the task. (Experimenter instructions to students are included in 
i^pendix A.) Easy or hard anagram tasks were then distributed, with a 
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ten-minute time limit on performance. 
Subjects' anagram sheets were coded, and the sheets were 
collected to be "scored." Following scoring, subjects were handed a 
sheet of paper giving the number of anagrams correctly solved (4 or 
16)f with a box checked indicating that they had either succeeded or 
failed on the task (depending on the experimental condition to which 
they had been assigned). This "outcome" sheet may be found in 
^^ipendix A. Subjects then completed the pre-consensus-feedback 
attributional measures found in i^^)endix A. Following that they were 
told either that 60% of their peers succeeded or that 60% of their 
peers failed (again, depending on experimental condition and the room 
to which subjects had been assigned). Experimenters wrote the bogus 
information about peer performance on the blackboard at the front of 
the classroom, indicating a 60/40 split of successes and failures, 
depending upon the "feedback" condition assigned to the subjects in 
the particular classroom. Finally, post-consensus-feedback 
attributional measures (as found in j^ipendix A) were distributed and 
filled out. After the experiment ended, students were told that the 
information regarding the performance of the other persons in the 
group was not accurate, and that the anagram task was designed so that 
everyone would either be able to solve more than 50% of the words, or 
would be unable to solve more than 50%. 
The second screen consisted of performing a median split on the 
obtained DACL scores. Those who scored in the upper half of the 
distribution, and who had also scored ten or above on the BDI were 
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retained in the DP group. Uiose who scored in the lower half of the 
DACL distribution, and who had also scored four or below on the BDI 
during mass testing were retained in the NDP group. 
From the 626 useable protocols generated by mass testing, 187 
(29.9%) students were contacted, agreed to participate, and completed 
the experiment itself. All of these students met the BDI criteria for 
classification as DP or NDP. However, only 113 of these students 
(60%) were in the a^ropriate DACL group required to pass through the 
second screen. These 113 individuals (60 females and 53 males) served 
as the subjects for this stu(fy. Biere were 74 subjects (40%) vAio were 
screened out of the experiment on the basis of their DACL scores. 
Statistics descriptive of the DP and NDP experimental groups are 
provided in Table 1. The ns of experimental subjects in the various 
experimental groupings are given in Table 2. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Planned Analvses 
TVo three-way MOWA's were employed to test the effects and 
interactions between mood, outcome, and covariation information (i.e., 
consensus feedback regarding the performance of peers) on the 
dependent variables of self- and other-attributions following the 
covariation information manipulation. TVro two-way MCVAs were 
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employed to test the effects and interactions between mood and 
outcome on the dependent variables of self- and other-attributions 
preceding the covariation information manipulation, A two-w^ MOVA 
was also used to test the effects of mood, outcome, and their 
interaction on subjects' expectations about others' performance. A 
new attributional variable, consisting of the difference scores 
between self-referenced and other-referenced attributions (following 
feedback, in both cases) was created, and a three-way ANOVA (Mood x 
Outcome X Feedback + interactions) was run on this variable. Finally, 
a three-way ANOVA (Mood x Outcome x Feedback + interactions) was run 
on post-feedback self-referent attributions, using pre-feedback self-
referent attributions as a covariate. 
Central Predictions Regarding Dependent Variables 
Regarding the following specific predictions about cell means, 
the reader is referred to the schematic diagram on the first page of 
this chapter. Each labeled cell is numbered in that diagram. 
Self Attributions Following Performance. (References are made 
here to consensus feedback in order to identify the individual cells 
involved in these predictions. However, consensus feedback had not 
yet been given at the time with which we are concerned in this section 
and the one following.) In the "failed performance" condition, the 
intemality means of DP cells 1 and 3 (feedback that others succeed 
and fail, respectively) will exceed those of NDP cells 5 and 7 
(feedback that others succeed and fail, respectively). Œhis is 
consistent with a central tenet of the reformulated learned 
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helplessness theory, that depressed persons attribute failure more 
internally than nondepressed persons. In the "successful performance" 
condition, the internalily means of NDP cells 6 and 8 (feedback that 
others succeed and fail, respectively) will exceed those of DP cells 2 
and 4 (feedback that others succeed and fail, respectively). Hiis is 
an expected replication of the finding that depressed persons 
attribute success more externally than nondepressed persons. 
Other Attributions Following Performance. %e internality 
means of "fail" DP cells 1 and 3 (feedback that others fail and 
succeed, respectively) will exceed those of NDP cells 5 and 7 (fail, 
with feedback that others fail and succeed, respectively). It is 
predicted that when stated expectancies of others' performances 
emphasize the self-comparison aspect of attributions about others, the 
self-depreciating tendencies of depressives and the self-serving 
attributions of nondepressives will result in significantly different 
attributions about the behavior of others. Similarly, it is predicted 
that the internality means of DP cells 2 and 4 (succeed, with feedback 
that others fail and succeed, respectively) will exceed those of NDP 
cells 6 and 8 (succeed, witli feedback that others fail and succeed, 
respectively) because of this social canparison process. 
Self Attributions Following Feedback. The internality means 
of NDP cells 6 and 7 (self succeed-other fail, and self fail-other 
succeed) will exceed those of NDP cells 5 and 8 (self fail-other fail, 
and self succeed-other succeed). Similarly, the internality means of 
DP cells 2 and 3 (self succeed-other fail, and self fail-other 
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succeed) will exceed those of DP cells 1 and 4 (self fail-other fail, 
and self succeed-other succeed). In all of these cases it is 
predicted that internal attributions will increase when one's behavior 
is perceived as unique compared to that of relevant others. [Riis will 
replicate data supportive of Kelley's covariation theory. 
Other Attributions Following Feedback. It is predicted that 
the intemality means of NDP cells 5 and 6 (self fail, with feedback 
that others fail or succeed, respectively) will exceed those of DP 
cells 1 and 2 (self fail, with feedback that others fail or succeed, 
respectively), again because of social comparison processes. A self-
serving attributional style will influence normals to attribute 
others' failures internally, while a self-effacing style will lead 
depressives to attribute others' failures externally. Similarly, 
depressives will tend to a.ttribute the success of others internally 
while normals will tend to attribute it externally, resulting in the 
means of DP cells 3 and 4 (fail and succeed, respectively, with 
feedback that others succeed) exceeding those of NDP cells 7 and 8 
(fail and succeed, respectively, with feedback that others succeed). 
Expectations of Others Following Own Performance. In accord 
with social canparison data, a main effect of mood on expectations 
about others' performances is predicted. Bie depressed group will 
expect higher performance of others than the nondepressed group, 
relative to their own performance. However in the absence of self-
reference, there will be no difference between the expectations of DP 
and NDP subjects. 
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RESULTS 
The results of this stucfy will be presented in two main sections. 
Ohe first section, on anagram performance, will conpare the actual 
performance of the depressed and nondepressed groups, and will also 
present data about the groups' expectations on this task as well as 
information about how their actual performance compares with their 
expectations. The second main section will deal with subjects' 
attributions about the task. In this section, results regarding self-
referenced and other-referenced attributions both prior to and 
following consensus feedback will be presented. Self- and other-
referenced attributions will be compared, as will pre- and post-
feedback attributions. Finally, a summary of the results will be 
presented in a third section. 
Anagram Performance 
Results of the actual performance on the anagrams task will be 
presented first. Hie possibility that depressed subjects may have 
actually performed more poorly on the anagram task than nondepressed 
subjects was considered. If this had been the case, then depressed 
subjects may have been accurate ("sadder but wiser") if th^ tended to 
attribute failure internally. However, a one-way ANOVA shewed no 
effect for mood on anagram performance (P=1.13; g <.29). 
Did depressed and nondepressed persons differ, then, in how they 
estimated the success of others? The present stu(ty asked a two-part 
question as follows. First, subjects were asked whether they believed 
the majority of others would succeed or fail at the task. Second, 
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they were asked a self-referenced question—to estimate the percentage 
of others who outperformed them on the task. It was hypothesized that 
mood would have no effect on the first question, but that there would 
be a main effect for mood on the self-referenced question. A one-way 
ANOVA on each of these two dependent variables revealed that there was 
no difference attributable to mood on either of the questions. In 
fact mood seaned to have a larger (but also nonsignificant) effect on 
appraisals of others' success or failure (P=1.76; p <.18) than on the 
self-referenced estimates (P=0.13; p <.72). 
Externality Attributions 
Sex Differences in Externality Attributions 
Before discussing the results of inferential procedures performed 
on externality attributions, the potentially confounding effects of 
sex on attributions will be presented. Each of the ANOVAs which will 
be described in the subsection which follows this was initially run 
with sex as a main effect, i^^ndix C displays the results of the 
ANOVA's which included sex as a main effect, and which utilized the 
attributional measure selected for use in the remainder of this stu^. 
In each instance it was found that sex failed to explain a significant 
amount of the variance in the dependent variable of interest. 
Therefore, sex was dropped as an independent variable and was not 
included as a main or interactive effect on ary of the ANOVA's which 
will be discussed in the subsection below. 
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Externality Attributions â§ Dependent Measures 
Five items were employed in measuring the internality/externality 
of attributions in order to increase the reliability of the 
attribution measure. (See i^spendix A for the internality/externality 
measures.) Each of the items consisted of a seven-point Likert scale. 
Three of the Likert scales (tJiose of items 1, 3, and 5 on the 
internality/externality measures found in i^)pendix A) were arrayed 
witdi the "high" end in an external direction, and two of the scales 
(tiiose of items 2 and 4) were arrayed wit± t±e "high" end in an 
internal direction. "Internal" items were alternated wit± "external" 
items. Hie items were combined arithmetically to produce a single 
score by subtracting the sum of the "internal" items from the sum of 
the "external" items. Since there were more "external" than 
"internal" items, t±e result was usually positive and represented an 
"externality" score. Bius, although the literature usually refers to 
this attributional dimension as "internality," tJie present author will 
refer to the dimension as "externality." The score represents a 
position on a two-pole dimension, with a high positive score 
representing external attributions. 
In the case of extreme externality of attributions, a protocol 
would display t±ie following responses to items: the t±ree "external" 
items would receive 7*s on the Likert scales, vrfiile the two "internal" 
items would receive I's. Subtracting the two internal items from t&e 
three external items would yield an arithmetic total of 19. In the 
case of extreme internality of attributions, a protocol would display 
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I's on the three externally-oriented Likert scales, and 7's on the two 
internally-oriented scales. Subtracting the two internal items fran 
the three external items would yield an arithmetic total of -11. By 
adding 11 points to each subject's attribution score, a scale is 
produced which ranges from 0 to 30. By transforming each scale in 
this way, a result is produced which is clearer and more readily 
interpretable. Accordingly, this O-to-30-point scale will be employed 
in the presentation of data which follows. 
Attributions of externality of the causes of outcomes will be 
examined in the following way. First, statistics pertaining to 
externality attributions made prior to consensus feedback will be 
described—as they relate to self, to others, and to self-other 
differences; second, statistics pertaining to attributions made 
following consensus feedback will be presented—again as related to 
self, to others, and to self-other differences. Finally, statistics 
pertaining to pre- post-feedback differences will be reported. 
Pre-feedback attributions regarding self. %e results of the 
ANOVA performed on attributions regarding self—prior to receiving 
feedback—are presented in Table 3. It can be seen that the model as 
a whole (i.e., the main effects and interactions which were specified) 
does explain a significant portion of the attributional variance 
2 (R =.17; F=7.20, 3df, p <.0005). Bhus we may move to consider the 
terms of the model. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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In considering the significance of the terras, only the "Type III" 
sums of squares will be employed. In the Statistical Analysis Qrstan 
(SAS)f lype III sums of squares measures only that portion of variance 
in the dependent measure which is unique to the term of the model 
which is being considered (SAS Institute, 1979, p. 243). Variance in 
the dependent measure which can be explained by the term, but which is 
not unique to the term, is excluded. 
The first effect specified, mood, did not explain a significant 
portion of the variability in attributions about one's own 
performance. However, outcome (i. e., the subject's experience of 
success or failure at the task) was a significant main effect, with 
those who failed being far more external in their attributions than 
those who succeeded (14.45 vs. 11.38; p <.0001). (A complete table of 
arithmetic means and standard deviations of the dependent variables 
may be found in i^pendix D. These were obtained using PBGC MEANS of 
the Statistical Analysis System (SAS Institute, 1979, p. 303).) 
In addition, a significant Mood x Outcrane interaction was found. 
Means appropriate to unbalanced designs were calculated for each point 
of this interaction, using PROC GIW of the Statistical Analysis System 
(SAS Institute, 1979, p. 249). Probabilities of getting the obtained 
difference in means under the hypothesis that the population means are 
equal were also calculated for each pair of means under the same SAS 
procedure. These are displ^ed in tabular form in Table 4. The 
interaction is displayed graphically in Figure 1. 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Visual inspection of the grajii reveals that depressed subjects 
are more external than nondepressed subjects in the success condition, 
but more internal than nondepressed subjects in the failure condition. 
Further examination of the gra£ii suggests, however, that both 
depressed and nondepressed subjects tend to become more external under 
failure conditions, but this tendency is more marked for the 
nondepressed than for the depressed subjects. In fact the means of 
the depressed and nondepressed subjects under the failure outcome do 
not differ significantly (14.10 vs. 14.83; p <.49). Nor do the means 
for depressed subjects under success and failure conditions, 
respectively (12.70 vs. 14.10; p <.20). Rather, the strongest effect 
is the difference in the nondepressed mean between the success and 
failure conditions (10.00 vs. 14.83; p <.0001). In fact, the only 
mean which differs significantly from the other three is that of the 
nondepressed subjects in the success condition. 
Pre-feedback attributions regarding others. Tlie results of 
the ANOVA on attributions about others' performance are presented in 
Table 5. Although the entire model again explained a significant 
portion of the attributional variance, only the outcome effect was 
significant on this dependent variable. Subjects who failed tended to 
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make more external attributions about others' performance than 
subjects who succeeded (15.44 vs. 12.77; p <.0006). Hie difference 
between depressed and nondepressed subjects' means on this variable 
was trivial (14.08 vs. 14.14; p <.94). There was also no effect for 
the Mood X Outcome interaction. (The reader is again referred to the 
complete table of means and standard deviations in Appendix D.) 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Pre-feedback differences in self-other attributions. Self-
other differences were examined by subtracting the other-referenced 
attribution score from the self-referenced attribution score and 
performing an ANOVA on the resulting difference score. The difference 
score would indicate whether subjects were demonstrating discrepancies 
in their attributions about their own vs. about others' performance. 
Results of this ANOVA are presented in Table 6. No effects for mood, 
outcome, or the interaction of these, were found. However, a 
nonsignificant trend was noted for the interaction (e <.06). Means 
for each point of the interaction are presented in Table 7, along with 
probabilities, for each pair of means, of getting the obtained 
difference in means under the hypothesis that the population means are 
equal. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
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Insert Table 7 about here 
Also listed in Table 7 are the probabilities of getting a mean of 
the magnitude obtained under the hypothesis that the population mean 
is equal to zero. These probabilities are interesting because if 
there is no difference in externality between self-attributions and 
other attributions, then subtracting the latter from the former should 
result in a difference score of zero. A positive difference score 
would result if subjects tended to make more external attributions 
about self than about others, while a negative difference score would 
result if subjects tended to make more external attributions about 
others than about self. The reader will note in Table 7 that the only 
mean difference score substantially different from zero is that of the 
nondepressed subjects in the success condition (-2.62; p <.004). 
Although caution must be used in interpreting the results of this t 
test because the aimibus test of significance for the interactive 
effect only approached significance, the difference of this particular 
mean from zero is large enough to be worthy of note. (Bonferroni's 
procedure with four comparisons and a .05 significance level would 
require a p <.012—cf. Kirk, 1982, p. 106.) It appears that 
nondepressed subjects who succeeded at the task were considerably more 
external in making attributions about others' performance than about 
their own performance. 
Did the nondepressed subjects who succeeded believe that others 
would also succeed? The reader will recall that no feedback about how 
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others performed had been given to subjects at this point in the 
stu^. The question is important because if these subjects believed 
that others would fail, then perhaps they were being charitable in 
attributing their performance externally. However, if they believed 
that others would succeed, then the external attributions would mean 
something different. 
A frequency table was set up (Table 8), to determine the number 
of depressed and nondepressed subjects in each outcome condition who 
expected others to succeed or fail. It can be seen that all of the 
nondepressed subjects who succeeded expected others to succeed. 
Visual inspection of the table shows that both groups' expectations 
tended to correspond with their outcomes. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
To clarify the potential meaning of attributions about others and 
to explore the matter in more detail, a new classification was 
established for attributional style, as applied to attributions about 
others. If others were expected to fail and attributions were 
external—or if others were expected to succeed and attributions were 
internal—then attributions could be seen as "other enhancing." On 
the other hand, if others were expected to fail and attributions were 
internal—or if others were expected to succeed and attributions were 
external—then attributions could be seen as "other downing." This 
was accomplished by reflecting the scores of the attributions for 
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others, depending upon whether the subject had stated s/he expected 
others to succeed or fail on the task. The reader will recall that 
the tendency for observers to attribute undesirable or negative 
behaviors internally for actors, while attributing them externally for 
themselves has been called a "self-protective" or "defensive" 
motivational bias. An ANOVA was performed on this variable, but no 
significant effects or interactions were found. The results of the 
ANOVA are presented in Table 9. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
Post-feedback attributions regarding self. %e reader will 
recall that, following the first round of attributions, subjects were 
given consensus feedback—either that most of the others in the 
experiment had succeeded on the task or that most of the others had 
failed on the task. Subsequently, subjects were again asked to make 
attributions about their own performance and the performance of 
others. Post-feedback ANOVA's, then, will include another main effect 
(feedback condition), two more two-way interactions, and a three-way 
interaction term. 
Results of the ANŒA on post-feedback self attributions are 
presented in Table 10. (The reader will recall that the same 
attributional questions were asked following feedback as were asked 
prior to feedback.) As in the pre-feedback analysis, a significant 
effect was found for outcome. Those who failed on the task continued 
to be more external in their attributions than those who succeeded 
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(14.52 vs. 11.35; p <.0001). Reference to the pre-feedback ANOVA 
reveals that neither group has changed much in the externality of its 
attributions'; pre-feedback means were 14.46 vs. 11.35 (p <.0001). 
(The reader is referred to the conplete table of means and standard 
deviations in ^ ^^ndix D.) 
Insert Table 10 about here 
The Mood X Outcome interaction, however# is no longer significant 
after consensus feedback. Although the externality means are still in 
the same rank order as before feedback (nondepressed fail > depressed 
fail > depressed succeed > nondepressed succeed), the gap between 
depressed and nondepressed subjects in both outcane conditions has 
narrowed (i.e., the absolute value of the differences in means by mood 
has decreased). Thus, the effects of outcome are not mediated by mood 
to the extent that they were prior to feedback. Means of post-
feedback self scores, along with the size and direction of the changes 
from pre-feedback scores, are presented in Table 11. Slopes of the 
now-nonsignificant interaction are presented graphically in Figure 2. 
Insert Table 11 about here 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
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A highly significant effect was found for the Mood x Feedback 
interaction (cf. Table 10). Rie means are presented in Table 12 ,  
along with the probabilities of getting the detained difference in 
means for each pair, under the hypothesis that the population means 
are equal. The reader will note that the mean of depressed subjects 
who received consensus feedback that others failed was significantly 
more internal than that of depressed subjects who recieved feedback 
that others succeeded. The opposite pattern is found for nondepressed 
subjects: those who got feedback that others succeeded were 
significantly more internal than those who got feedback that others 
failed. Accordingly, feedback about others' performance seems to have 
a differential effect upon subjects, depending upon their mood. These 
results are presented grajiiically in Figure 3. 
Insert Table 12 about here 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Although the Outcane x Feedback interaction was not significant, 
an examination of the means can prove instructive. They are presented 
in Table 13, along with probabilities of getting the obtained 
difference in pairs of means under the hypothesis that the population 
means are equal. One can see that they are rank ordered in the 
following w^: failure outcome + failure feedback > failure outcome + 
success feedback > success outcome + failure feedback > success 
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outcome + success feedback. From these data it appears that 
externality of attributions is more a function of outcome than of 
feedback, as was alrea^ apparent from the omnibus ANCWA. 
Insert Table 13 about here 
Finally, the three way interaction of Mood x Outcome x Feedback 
upon attributions about one's own performance will be discussed. 
While this three way interaction did not reach significance (P=1.39; p 
<.24), several comparisons of means were planned at the outset of this 
stu(fy, and these will now be discussed. Means of each of the eight 
(2x2x2) cells is listed in Table 14, along with estimates of the 
probability of obtaining the daserved differences between each pair of 
means under the hypothesis that the population means are equal. It 
will be noted that 28 pairwise comparisons of means have been made, 
and that 14 of these (50%) reach or exceed the .05 level of 
significance. (One would predict, on the basis of chance alone, that 
only one of these comparisons would reach significance.) The 
Bonferroni procedure was used to guard against Type I error in this 
instance (cf. Kirk, 1982, p. 106). Because of the large number of 
comparisons, the Bonferroni procedure represents a very conservative 
standard in this case. With 28 conçarisons, using a .05 level of 
significance, a p <.0017 is required to adequately rule out a Type I 
error. Bie results of this procedure are also presented in Table 14. 
Insert Table 14 about here 
It was predicted that, for nondepressed subjects, the means of 
cells involving consonant feedback (i.e., success feedback when the 
subject succeeded and failure feedback when the subject failed) would 
be more external than the means of cells involving dissonant feedback 
(i.e., feedback that others performed in a way contrary to the 
subject's performance). ïhis is siiiply a test of covariation theory, 
which suggests that the intemality of one's attributions is 
controlled by consensus feedback. An examination of the table reveals 
that, for nondepressed subjects, the weighted mean of consonant means 
is 13.96 and that for dissonant means is 12.18 (i(47)=1.59, p <.09), 
so that the hypothesis is not confirmed. 
A closer inspection of Table 14 discloses that it is the failure 
condition (cells 1 and 5) rather than the success condition (cells 4 
and 8) vAiich is responsible for the external direction of the 
consonant means. In the consonant success condition (i.e., success 
outcome, success feedback—cell 8 mean of 8.70), nondepressed subjects 
are significantly more internal (p <.0001) than in the consonant 
failure condition (i.e., failure outcome, failure feedback—cell 5 
mean of 18.00). Reference to Table 4 shows that, prior to receiving 
consensus information, the mean of nondepressed subjects was 14.83 in 
the failure condition and 10.00 in the success condition. It appears, 
then, that receiving consonant feedback had the effect of moving 
attributions in a more external direction (as covariation theory would 
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predict) only in the failure outcome condition. In the success 
outcome condition, on the other hand, nondepressed subjects became 
more internal in their attributions following feedback that others had 
also succeeded. 
In the dissonant circumstances, the means of the nondepressed 
group do not differ significantly across outcomes (12.12 success 
outcome vs. 12.25 failure outcome; g <.93). Again referring to Table 
4, it will be noted that the nondepressed group had a mean of 10.00 in 
the success outcome condition and a mean of 14.83 in the failure 
outcome condition. Thus it appears that dissonant feedback had the 
effect of increasing the internality of attributions (as predicted by 
covariation theory) only in the failure condition. In the success 
condition, nondepressed subjects became more external in their 
attributions in spite of the dissonant feedback. 
A similar prediction was not made for consonant vs. dissonant 
scores of the depressed subjects, since it was anticipated that this 
highly selected group (chosen from less than 30% of the mass testing 
population who were eligible) may not represent "the person on the 
street," and that covariation principles may not apply in the same way 
to this population. Indeed, upon examination of the Table 14 it will 
be noted that the mean of consonant means for depressed subjects is 
12.41, while the mean of dissonant means for these subjects is 13.06 
(t(46)=1.17, E <.28, two-tailed). Thus depressed subjects, in 
general, do not appear to change their attributions in a way v^ich 
covariation theory might predict. In fact, the attributional change. 
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though nonsignificant, was in a direction opposite to that predicted 
by the theory. 
Reference to Table 4 shows that the mean attribution score of 
depressed subjects who failed was 14.10. Following dissonant 
consensus feedback, the mean score moved in an external direction, to 
15.38. Following consonant consensus feedback, the mean score moved 
in an internal direction, to 12.00. Thus, again, when they are given 
information about how relevant others performed on a task in which 
depressed subjects failed, these subjects modify their self-
attributions in a direction which is at variance with that predicted 
by covariation theory. 
Reference, again, to Table 4 shows that the mean attribution 
score of depressed subjects who succeeded was 12.70. Following 
dissonant consensus feedback, the mean score moved in an internal 
direction, to 10.75. Following consonant consensus feedback, the mean 
score made a trivial move in an external direction, to 12.71. %us, 
under conditions of a successful outcome, depressed persons use 
covariation information in a way which is consistent with, or at least 
not at odds with, covariation theory. 
Ihe differences between pre- and post-feedback attributions will 
be discussed in more detail as the final portion of this section. 
Post-feedback attributions regarding others. Results of the 
ANOVA analyzing attributions regarding others following consensus 
feedback are presented in Table 15. The reader will note that no 
significant effect was found for mood. As was the case prior to 
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feedback about others' performancey there was no difference between 
depressed and nondepressed subjects in the externality attributed to 
others. However, highly significant effects were found for outcome 
and feedback. Subjects who failed tended to rate others as more 
external (14.07) than subjects who succeeded (12.27; p <.004). Subjects 
given feedback that others had failed tended to rate those others as 
more external (14.45) than subjects given feedback that others had 
succeeded (12.21; g <.002). 
Insert Table 15 about here 
A significant Outcome x Feedback interaction was also found, 
sujçorting the notion that the effect of feedback was modified by 
subjects' performance on the task. Means pertaining to the 
interaction, together with probabilities of obtaining the pairwise 
observed differences between the means under the hypothesis that the 
population means are equal, are presented in Table 16. The reader 
will note that failure feedback tended to have an externalizing effect 
on subjects in both outcome conditions, but that this is much more 
evident in the failure outcone than in the success outcome. In fact, 
only the failure outcome-failure feedback mean differs significantly 
from the other three. ïhat this should be in an external direction is 
consistent with covariation theory. 
Insert Table 16 about here 
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Finally, a Mood x Feedback interaction was found for attributions 
regarding others following feedback. Bie means of this interaction, 
along with probabilities of getting the observed differences in means 
under the hypothesis that the population means are equal, are 
presented in Table 17. %e reader will note that the depressed means 
of both feedback conditions do not differ from each other (13.59 under 
failure feedback vs. 12.69 under success feedback; p <.68). However, 
both these means have moved in a modestly internalizing direction 
following the feedback; the prefeedback mean for depressed subjects 
was 14.14. 
Insert Table 17 about here 
A different pattern of attributions resulted for nondepressed 
subjects following feedback. For these subjects, the feedback 
condition did make a significant difference. The externality mean for 
nondepressed subjects getting failure feedback was 14.17, while that 
for nondepressed subjects getting success feedback was 11.85 (p 
<.001). Ihus, nondepressed subjects were considerably more willing 
to make external attributions about the causes of others' failure on 
the task than about the causes of others' successes. Furthermore, 
nondepressed subjects' attributions about others' successes were also 
significantly less external than those of depressed subjects (10.81 
nondepressed vs. 13.26 depressed; p <.02). When others failed, though, 
nondepressed and depressed subjects did not differ significantly in 
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the direction of their attributions (15.10 nondepressed vs. 13.59 
depressed; g <.19). 
Post-feedback differences ia self-other attributions. An 
MOVA was run on the scores resulting from subtracting other-
attributions from self-attributions following feedback. Ohe results 
of this analysis are presented in Table 18. 
Insert Table 18 about here 
The effect of mood on this difference score was not significant. 
The mean difference score of depressed subjects was -0.81, while that 
for nondepressed subjects was -0.22. A mean of zero would indicate 
that subjects were equally external in making attributions about the 
causes of their own outcomes and that of others. Single-sample t-
tests revealed that neither of these means differed significantly from 
zero (E <.13 for the depressed group, and p <.68 for the nondepressed 
group). 
A significant effect was found for feedback. There was a bigger 
discrepancy between self- and other-attributions when subjects were 
given failure feedback than when they were given success feedback 
(-1.30 for failure feedback vs. 0.27 for success feedback; p <.04). 
In the success feedback condition, subjects did not discriminate 
between self and others in making external attributions (p of a 
greater t under the hypothesis that the mean equals zero is <.60). 
However, in the failure feedback condition, subjects made 
significantly more external attributions regarding others than 
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regarding themselves (g <.02). 
%e Mood X Feedback interaction also proved to be significant. 
Tlable 19 displ^s the means relevant to this interaction, along with 
probabilities of obtaining the observed pairwise differences in means 
under the hypothesis that the population means are equal. 
Probabilities that the means differ significantly frcm a hypothesized 
population mean of zero are also displayed. Bie reader will note that 
the mean of the depressed group who received failure feedback stands 
out from the remainder of the means, Œhis group appears to have 
differed more than any other group in externality attributed to self 
vs. that attributed to others. This group's mean is also the only 
mean which differs significantly frcm zero. Hie direction of the 
difference from zero suggests that this group tended to attribute more 
externally to others than to self. A comparison of this mean with 
that of the nondepressed group receiving failure feedback suggests 
that the depressed group exhibits the above-mentioned tendency to a 
significantly greater degree (p <.05) than the nondepressed group. A 
further comparison of this mean with that of the depressed group 
receiving success feedback suggests that this group exhibits this 
tendency to a significantly greater degree than the group receiving 
success feedback (p <.004). Biese findings are not unexpected. 
Insert Table 19 about here 
96 
Finally, a significant Outcome x Feedback interaction was found. 
Ihe means associated with this interaction are listed in Table 20 ,  
along with the probabilities associated with hypotheses of no 
differences between the means, and no difference between the mean and 
zero in each case. The reader will note that the means of the success 
outcome groups do not differ from each other by feedback condition. 
However, the failure outcome means do differ (p <.003), with those 
receiving dissonant (success) feedback rating their cwn performance as 
more externally determined than that of others (1.49; p <.02), and 
those receiving consonant (failure) feedback rating their own 
performance as more internally determined than that of others (-1.66; 
p <.04). 
Insert Table 20 about here 
Although the three-way interaction was not significant, a look at 
the ei^t cell means can prove instructive. They are displayed in 
Table 21, along with the probabilities of their differing 
significantly frcm zero. It can be seen that the only two means which 
differ significantly from zero (i.e., the only two means involving 
significant differences in self-other attributions) are those of the 
depressed subjects who failed on the task. Depressed subjects who 
failed and receive feedback that others succeeded achieved a self-
other difference mean of -3.70 (p of difference from zero <.003). 
Depressed subjects who failed and received feedback that others failed 
achieved a difference score mean of 2.24 (p of difference from zero 
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<.01). Furthennore, these two means differ significantly frcm each 
other (e <.0001). Depressed subjects who failed and received feedback 
that others succeeded were significantly more external in rating their 
own performance than that of others. On the other hand, depressed 
subjects who failed and received feedback that others also failed were 
significantly less external in rating their own performance than that 
of others. 
Insert Table 21 about here 
Attention will now be given to presenting the final portion of 
the experimental results: those pertaining to pre- and post-feedback 
differences in attributions regarding self and others. 
Changes in attributions regarding self and others following 
feedback. In order to analyze changes in attributions, variations 
in prefeedback attributions were controlled by using these scores as 
covariates. Analyses of covariance (ANOOVAs) were then run on the 
postfeedback scores. Scores pertaining to self-attributions will be 
discussed first, then scores pertaining to attributions about others 
will be addressed. 
Results of the ANCDVA on changes in self-attributions are 
displayed in Table 22. Only the Mood x Feedback interaction proved to 
be significant. Means of the four points of the interaction, 
corrected for the covariate, are presented in Table 23. Probabilities 
of obtaining a larger t score under the hypothesis that means are 
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equal are presented for each pairwise comparison of means. The reader 
will note that nondepressed subjects differed in how they responded to 
consensus information^ with depressed subjects becoming more internal 
and nondepressed subjects becoming more external in the face of 
failure information. 
Insert Table 22 about here 
Insert Table 23 about here 
Results of the ANOOVA on changes in other-attributions are shown 
in Table 24. The reader will note that a significant feedback effect 
was achieved. Those who received failure feedback rated others in a 
considerably more external direction following feedback than did those 
who received success feedback (3.45 in the failure condition vs. 1.21 
in the success condition—means corrected for prefeedback scores). 
Insert Table 24 about here 
Mood did not affect changes in attributions regarding others as 
it did changes in attributions regarding self. Neither the main mood 
effect nor the two- or three-way interactions involving mood proved tp 
be significant. 
However, the Outcane x Feedback interaction was significant. 
Corrected means corresponding to this interaction are presented in 
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Table 25. Subjects who failed and received feedback that others also 
failed tended to move their attributions about others in a markedly 
external direction (corrected mean of 5.68), while subjects who 
succeeded and received feedback that others succeeded did not change 
their attributions about others as much (corrected mean of 1.96). 
Ihese means differ significantly at p <.0009. However, the means of 
subjects receiving dissonant feedback, vrfiether they succeeded or 
failed themselves, did not differ as much (0.32 for success outcome + 
failure feedback vs. 1.80 for failure outcome + success feedback—both 
corrected for pre-feedback scores; p <.12). 
Insert Table 25 about here 
Summary of Findings 
Findings will be summarized in the order presented. First, 
findings related to anagram performance will be summarized, then 
attributional findings will be identified—as related to self, to 
others, and to change scores. Finally, findings related to planned 
comparisons will be summarized. 
Anagram Performance 
Depressed and nondepressed subjects did not differ in their 
ability to solve the anagram puzzles, therefore, mood-related 
attributional differences cannot be seen as related to subjects' 
actual performance on the task. 
Mood did not affect subjects' expectations about the performance 
of others—even when self-referenced comparisons were invited. This 
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was contrary to the expectation that depressed subjects would expect 
others to perform better than themselves, relative to nondepressed 
subjects. 
Externality Attributions 
Externality attributions did not vary with subjects' sex under 
any circumstances. Accordingly, sex was dropped from further 
analysis, and was not considered in any interactions. 
Prior to consensus feedback, subjects' self-referenced 
attributions showed that task outcome was a significant determiner of 
attributions. Failure outcane elicited more external attributions 
than success outcome. The expected Mood x Outcome interaction also 
reached significance. In the success outcome condition, depressed 
subjects made more external attributions than did nondepressed 
subjects. In the failure outcane condition, nondepressed subjects 
made more external attributions than did depressed subjects. 
Inspection of the four means involved in this interaction shewed, 
however, that only the nondepressed-success mean differed 
significantly from the others. 
Prior to consensus feedback, other-referenced attributions were 
influenced by the attributor's own outcome on the task. Those who 
succeeded on the task were willing to make significantly more internal 
attributions about others' performance than those who failed. A 
crosstabs table showed that this effect had a rather charitable twist: 
subjects who succeeded overwhelmingly expected that others would also 
succeed. 
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A comparison of self-referenced and other-referenced attributions 
showed an interesting effect. Nondepressed subjects who succeeded 
also made self-enhancing attributions, Ihat is, they attributed their 
own successful outcomes more internally than those of others. 
Following consensus feedback, outccme was still a determiner of 
attributional style. Biose who failed on the task continued to be 
significantly more external in their self-referenced attributions than 
those who succeeded. However, the Mood x Outcome interaction was no 
longer significant. Although the rank order of means was the same as 
before feedback, an examination of the means showed that consensus 
information had the effect of moving them closer together. Ihe effect 
of outcome on attributions, then, was not modified by mood to the 
extent it was before consensus feedback. However, the effect of 
feedback on attributions was highly mediated by mood (i.e., there was 
a highly significant Mood x Feedback interaction). Receiving feedback 
that others succeeded resulted in more external attributions for 
depressed subjects, relative to nondepressed subjects. Receiving 
feedback that others failed resulted in more internal attributions for 
depressed subjects, relative to nondepressed subjects. A comparison 
of Outcome x Feedback means showed that outcome is a more inçortant 
determiner of their rank order (i.e., of their externality) than is 
feedback. This was alrea(ty apparent from the ANOVA, which registered 
a significant effect for outcome but not for feedback. 
Attributions about others following consensus feedback was still 
influenced by outcome, just as they were prior to consensus feedback. 
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Again, subjects who succeeded tended to rate others' performances as 
more internal than subjects who failed. However, if one controls for 
prefeedback attributions (by running an ANOOVA), the effect loses its 
significance. As expected, getting information about others' 
performance was highly influential in determining attributions about 
them (i.e., the feedback effect was significant). Charitably, 
subjects tended to attribute the performance of others who failed more 
externally than they attributed the performance of others who 
succeeded. However, this effect was also modified by the subjects' 
own outcome (i.e., the Outcane x Feedback interaction was 
significant). Uie interaction remained significant even after 
controlling for prefeedback attributions. Subjects who failed tended 
to be rather more generous in attributing others' failures externally 
than subjects who succeeded. Ihe Mood x Feedback interaction was also 
significant, with nondepressed subjects tending to be more generous in 
attributing others' successes internally than depressed subjects. 
A comparison of self-referenced and other-referenced attributions 
following feedback showed an interesting effect for feedback. Given 
information that others had succeeded, subjects did not discriminate 
greatly in self vs. other attributions. But getting information that 
others had failed seemed to provide an occasion to discriminate, with 
subjects becoming more internal in their attributions about their own 
performance than about the performance of others. This effect was 
also modified by the subjects' own outcomes (i.e., the Outcome x 
Feedback interaction was significant). In the success outcome 
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condition, feedback made no impact on self-other attributional 
differences. However in the failure outcome, feedback did provide an 
occasion to discriminate. Biose who received consonant (failure) 
feedback rated their own performance as more internally determined 
than others' performances, while those who received dissonant 
(success) feedback rated their own performance as more externally 
determined that that of others. In addition, the Mood x Feedback 
interaction was significant. Feedback seemed to provide an occasion 
for the depressed group to make self-other discriminations, but not 
for the nondepressed group. The depressed group tended to be rather • 
forgiving in doing this. Depressed persons who received feedback that 
others failed were quite a lot more external in their attributions 
about others than about themselves. Biis did not hold true for the 
nondepressed group, nor for either group in the success feedback 
condition. 
An analysis of changes in self-referenced attributions following 
feedback shewed a significant Mood x Feedback interaction. Feedback 
apparently effected larger changes in nondepressed subjects' 
attributions than in depressed subjects' attributions. Analysis of 
changes in other-referenced attributions following feedback showed 
that those who got information that others failed moved their 
attributions about others in a considerably more external direction 
than those who got information that others succeeded (i.e., a main 
effect for feedback was found). 
104 
Planned Comparisons 
Results of the planned comparisons will be summarized in the same 
order used to present the general attributional findings; first, 
results of pre-feedback findings will be summarized; then results of 
post-feedback findings; and finally, results of findings regarding 
change scores. 
Depressed subjects who failed the task were not more internal in 
their attributions than nondepressed subjects who failed. However, 
nondepressed subjects who succeeded were more internal than depressed 
subjects who succeeded. Depressed subjects who failed did not make 
more internal attributions about others' performance than nondepressed 
subjects who failed. Depressed subjects who succeeded did not make 
more internal attributions about others than nondepressed subjects who 
succeeded. 
Following feedback, the attributional means of nondepressed 
subjects receiving consensus information which was at odds with their 
own performance (i.e., dissonant feedback) were not more internal than 
nondepressed subjects who received consensus information which was in 
harmony with their own performance (i.e., consonant feedback). 
Nondepressed subjects receiving failure feedback did not make more 
internal attributions about others' performance than depressed 
subjects who received failure feedback. Depressed subjects receiving 
success feedback did not make more internal attributions about others 
than nondepressed subjects receiving success feedback. In fact, the 
data tended to support the opposite conclusion, namely that depressed 
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subjects receiving success feedback made more external attributions 
about others' performance than nondepressed subjects receiving success 
feedback. 
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DISCUSSION 
At the outset of this stu^, several questions were posed 
concerning depression and the processing of social information. What 
expectations do depressed persons have about how others will perform 
relative to themselves? Do depressives have a distinct "attributional 
style" regarding the successes and failures of others? Given 
information that relevant others failed on a task, will depressives 
who failed give up their internal attributions? 
The discussion of these questions in the light of the present 
stu^ will open with a review of previous findings relevant to the 
questions. Following that, the theoretical implications of the 
present findings will be discussed. ïhen seme practical implications 
for the treatment of depression will be presented. Finally, the 
limitations of the present stu(fy will be discussed and suggestions for 
further research will be made. 
Review of Previous Relevant Findings 
Several previous studies were summarized whose results had 
bearing on the above questions. Pietromonaco and Markus (1985) found 
that depressive negativity does not extend to perceptions of others. 
In fact, Lobitz and Post (1979) found that depressives rated others 
more positively than themselves, and Sharp and Tennen (1983) 
discovered that depressives tended to ignore the faulty performance of 
others and blame themselves for (tyadic failures. 
Sweeney, Shaeffer, and Golin (1982) found that depressed students 
did not differ from nondepressed students in attributional style 
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regarding others. However, this stu^ involved no social comparison 
with a relevant other, which is a crucial element in both the Beck and 
the revised learned helplessness models of depression. 
Tabachnik, Crocker, and Alley (1984) reasoned that self 
evaluations (tepend partly on consensus information, and found that 
nondepressed persons perceived themselves as more similar to others 
than did depressed persons. Any dissimilarities identified by 
nondepressed persons tended to be self-enhancing (i.e., the^ perceived 
themselves more positively than they perceived others). The absence 
of this tendency toward an "illusory warm glow" (Lewinsohn, Mischel, 
Chaplin, & Barton, 1980) among depressives has been noted frequently, 
leading some to suggest that depressed persons may be "sadder, but 
wiser" (Alley & Abramson, 1979). Kuiper and Derry (1981) identified a 
"contrast effect" among both the depressed and the nondepressed. The 
effect involves both the self-serving and other-depreciating 
perceptions of nondepressives, as well as the tendency of depressives 
to maintain and increase their sense of inadequacy by heightening the 
positive traits of others. Just as the negative thinking of 
depressives does not extend to their perceptions of others, neither 
does the "illusory warm glew" of nondepressives extend to their 
perceptions of others. 
The present stuc^ was designed 1) to compare the expectations 
held by depressed and nondepressed persons about how others would 
perform on an identical task; 2) to compare the effects of performance 
and consensus information on the attributional processes of depressed 
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and nondepressed persons; and 3) to explore the effects of consensus 
information on attributional biases of depressed and nondepressed 
persons relative to others. 
Theoretical Implications of the Present Findings 
Attributions About One's Own Performance 
With regard to attributions about one's cwn performance, three 
findings of the present research seem most salient. One is that the 
expected Mood x Outcome effect, which is the hallmark of the learned 
helplessness approach to the gtienomenon of depression, emerged prior 
to consensus feedback, but with a rather different configuration than 
can be understood on the basis of learned helplessness theory per se. 
Ohe second is that this interaction disappeared from significance 
following the provision of consensus information. îhe third salient 
finding, demonstrated in the highly significant Mood x Feedback 
interaction which emerged following the provision of consensus 
information, is that depressed and nondepressed persons processed the 
information in entirely different ways. These findings will now be 
discussed individually. 
The Mood X Outcome Effect—Prior to Consensus Feedback. The 
revised learned helplessness theory predicts that depressives 
attribute failure more internally than nondepressives (e.g., Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Later theorists working from the same 
tradition also posited a tendency for depressives to attribute success 
more internally than nondepressives (e.g., Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, 
& von Baeyer, 1979). The Mood x Outcome interaction revealed in the 
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present analysis was consistent with both these predictions. 
However r more recent theorists have devised what is known as a 
"strong prediction" and a "weak prediction" to tençer learned-
helplessness prognostication (e.g., Zuroff, 1981). The "strong 
prediction" is that depressives attribute failure internally, in an 
absolute sense. However, the data have not always supported this 
prediction, therefore a "weak prediction" was developed, that 
depressives attribute failure internally not in an absolute sense, but 
only relative to nondepressives. Data of the present stu(fy tend to 
support the weak prediction, but not the strong prediction. 
In fact, the present data might suggest that a "strong" and 
"weak" prediction relative to subjects' attributions of success be 
considered. The present results reveal that depressives attribute 
success externally relative to nondepressives. However, relative to 
their own failure attributions, depressives* success attributions are 
more internal. %us, one mi^t note that a "weak prediction" about 
depressives' success attributions was confirmed in this stucfy. 
A second interesting development in the tradition of the learned 
helplessness theory was that the perception of noncontingency between 
response and outcome which was originally considered to be the core 
deficit of depression, was later found to have its counterpart in a 
social psychological jAienonenon which came to be called "the illusion 
of control" (Martin, Abramson, & Alley, 1984). In other words, 
depressives were found to be more accurate in estimating response-
outcome contingency than nondepressives. 
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Results of the present research suggest that the familiar 
discrepancy between depressives' and nondepressives' attributional 
styles in situations of success and failure also be vulnerable to 
an interpretation of "depressive realism." In other words, what has 
been seen by learned helplessness theorists as a depressive deficit 
may alternatively be seen as an excess on the part of normals. ïhis 
alternative explanation can be clarified with reference to the 
configuration of the present Mood x Feedback interaction (Figure 1). 
In the interaction, one can see that the variation in outcome had 
a much larger effect on the attributions of normals than on those of 
depressives. Means of depressives do not differ significantly by 
outcome, while means of normals become highly more external under 
conditions of failure. %us the phenomenon of depressives and normals 
making different sorts of attributions following task outcomes appears 
to have more to do with the psychology of "the person on the street" 
than with abnormal psychology. Nondepressed persons appear to enhance 
themselves attributing success internally, vMle defending 
themselves by attributing failure externally. Depressed persons 
appear to lack this "illusory warm glow" which may accmpany internal 
attributions of success. 
However, it is possible that the particular configuration of the 
interaction in the present stucfy results from the relatively low level 
of depression in this particular "depressed" group of subjects. Hie 
depressed subjects in the present stu<fy were obviously functioning 
well enough to be attending classes and interested enough either in 
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their grades or in gaining some extra experience to become involved in 
a psychology experiment. It is accurate to label them mildly-to-
moderately depressed. But Depue and Monroe's (1978) caveat about 
applying results gathered from such a population to persons with major 
affective disorders must be heeded. With the latter group as 
subjects, a different configuration may have resulted, giving more 
credibility to interpreting the discrepancy as a depressive deficit. 
The Mood £ Outcome Effect—Following Consensus Feedback. 
After consensus information was provided to the subjects, the 
discr^ancy between depressed and nondepressed persons' attributions 
regarding their successes and failures disappeared. Reference to 
Figure 2 demonstrates that both mood groups displayed roughly the same 
pattern of attributions under the two outcomes. Statistically, the 
interaction was no longer significant. It appears, then, that having 
access to salient consensus information has a powerful effect on 
attributions regarding outcomes. Psychotherapeutic possibilities 
which follow from these findings will be addressed below. 
At the outset of this stu^, one of the central questions was 
whether providing consensus information could serve to alleviate the 
depressive attributional deficit. But when attributions were measured 
prior to the provision of consensus information, no such deficit was 
found. Depressive attributions did not vary significantly by outcome, 
as nondepressive attributions did. Therefore, what appeared at first 
blush to be a depressive deficit looked, after closer examination, 
more like a nondepressive excess. Accordingly, the central question 
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could more properly be ^ Airased as follows: did the provision of 
consensus information serve to narrow the gap between depressive and 
nondepressive attributions about the causes of outcomes? The answer 
to this question is clearly "yes." 
The Mood g Feedback Effect. While feedback of consensus 
information had the effect of eliminating the discrepancy between 
depressed and nondepressed persons' attributions about outcomes, the 
feedback itself was not perceived in an equivalent way ky both mood 
groups. Bie significant Mood x Feedback effect demonstrated that 
response to consensus information is highly attenuated by one's 
depressed or nondepressed mood. As reference to Figure 3 
demonstrates, depressed persons who received feedback that others 
failed the task were more highly internal in their attributions than 
their mood-related counterparts who received feedback that others 
succeeded on the task. The reverse was true for nondepressed persons. 
Depressed and nondepressed means also differed significantly in each 
feedback condition. 
The finding supports the notion of a depressed/nondepressed 
discrepancy in processing social information, which may be inportant 
in the development and maintenance of depression. Previous research 
findings have already suggested that discrepant social information 
processing—particularly in the perception of consensus cues—is 
involved in depression. Tabachnik, Crocker, and Alloy (1983), and 
Sharp and Tennen (1983) both found such discrepancies in depressed 
populations. However the Tabachnik et al. stu(ty did not include a 
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performance condition, and the Sharp and Tennen stu^ did not provide 
differential (success/failure) outcomes or differential, salient 
consensus feedback conditions. Nevertheless in both studies depressed 
persons tended to overlook or misperceive consensus information which 
could alleviate self-blame or feelings of inadequacy. Ohe present 
study, ky including a performance condition as well as a salient, 
differential consensus feedback condition, helps extend and clari^ 
the parameters of the mood-related discrepancy in processing social 
information. 
The attenuation of consensus information by mood in the present 
experiment may perhaps best be understood by referring to social 
comparison theory. This theory maintains that in comparing oneself 
with others, one employs consensus information in an effort to 
determine how one is similar to or different from others. Festinger 
(1954) suggested that there is a drive to enhance oneself through the 
social comparison process. The reader will recall, then, that under 
normal circumstances, people tend to engage in "upward comparison." 
Normals have been found to utilize "false" consensus information 
in making social comparisons. That is, they often estimate a high 
consensus for the qualities they themselves possess (Ross, Greene, & 
House, 1977). Recently Sherman, Chassin, Presson, and Agostinelli 
(1984) found that this effect is more marked when conçarisons are made 
with targets having desired traits or capabilities than with targets 
having neutral or negative traits or capabilities. Thus, as Festinger 
suggested, they tend to enhance themselves through the social 
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comparison process. 
In the present experiment, nondepressed subjects made 
significantly more internal attributions after getting consensus 
information that others had succeeded on a task. It would appear that 
they utilized this consensus information in a self-enhancing way, as 
if to say, "I have the same capabilities which those successful others 
have," thus generating internal attributions for themselves. 
Moreover, the nondepressed subjects also made considerably more 
external attributions after getting consensus information that others 
had failed on the task—as if to put distance between thanselves and 
those inadequate performers. 
Nondepressed subjects seemed to exhibit an affective buoyancy 
which was reflected in their attributional styles. Sane anecdotal 
information, gleaned frcm their protocols, can perhaps demonstrate 
this best. For exan^le, one such subject failed the task and received 
feedback that others had succeeded. When asked to state the major 
determinant of his/her own performance, the subject reported, "Not 
enough time." But when asked to state the major determinant of the 
others' successful performance, s/he stated, "They've had more 
practice at this sort of thing than I have." Thus the subject managed 
to find a way to avoid blaming self for the failure, while 
simultaneously not crediting others' successes to their superior 
abilities. (The others, of course, were under the same time 
constraints as the subject!) 
Just the reverse of this pattern was found for depressed 
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subjects. That is, they tended to make more internal attributions 
after receiving consensus information that others failed, while making 
more external attributions after getting information that others 
succeeded. This finding would suggest that, while nondepressed 
subjects compared upwardly, depressed subjects corpared downwardly. 
This finding is also not novel in the social COTiparison 
literature. Wills (1981) suggested that downward comparison tends to 
occur when the subject is not in a state of subjective well-being. 
Thus, I^szczynski, Greenberg, and LaPrelle (1985) found that subjects 
who had failed on a "social sensitivity test" preferred information 
about other students who had performed poorly, and Gibbons (1986) 
found that subjects whose moods had been tanporarily worsened 
preferred to get information from people who were also experiencing 
negative affect. It appears, as Gibbons has suggested, that "misery 
loves company." 
Œie might speculate, then, that depressed subjects attributed 
more internally when given information about others' failures because 
they identified in some way with those others. Again, some anecdotal 
information may clariJ^ this speculation. For instance, one depressed 
subject who failed attributed his/her failure internally, stating, 
"I'm not very good at anagrams." After getting information that 
others also failed the task, the subject retained his/her internal 
attribution and, when asked to make an attribution about others' 
failures, stated, "Most people aren't that good at anagrams." This 
individual steadfastly avoided grading self or others on a nice. 
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lenient curve! Attributing failure to task difficulty apparently did 
not occur to the subject—either for self or for the others. 
That the impact of consensus information on attributions was 
attenuated mood in this stu(fy is quite clear. Reference to social 
comparison theory helps to explain the particular pattern of the Mood 
X Feedback interaction which was found. But could there be some 
underlying mechanism which would explain hSK subjects processed the 
incOTiing social information which, in turn, led to the observed 
pattern of interaction? In other words, does the literature suggest 
an intrapsychic mechanism which can account for the interpersonal 
effects which have been observed in this experiment? 
The reader may recall that Fiske, Kenney, and Taylor (1982) 
developed a structural model for the mediation of salience effects on 
attributions. They proposed that, in making attributions, people do 
not operate as "scientists" in the objective, positivistic sense which 
Kelley (1967) sought to employ as a model. Rather, they seem to 
operate more subjectively or paradigmatically—from a particular point 
of view, or "schona." The authors suggest that certain aspects of a 
situation become salient, that attention is then directed to these 
aspects, and that schema-relevant information is encoded in more 
detail than other information. A schema, as the term is used these 
writers, consists of "organized prior knowledge or rules about how to 
infer causality" (p. 123). Causal attributions, then, are likely to 
proceed out of the attributor's schemata. 
In support of this interpretation of the data. Beck (1967) has 
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discussed how depressives' negative self-schemata become activated 
under certain circumstances. Once schemata are activated, the 
depressed person distorts information in a way which fits the 
schemata. Failure to accommodate the schema to discrepant information 
results in failure to assimilate schema-countering information. The 
product of these failures is increasingly rigid and more distorted 
perceptions of the environment which, in a cyclic way, makes it even 
less likely bhat discrepant information will modify the schema. 
Depressive schemata involve negative expectations about self, world 
and future. It may be that performing a task to be scored and 
compared with one's peers is just such an activating event for these 
depressed college undergraduates. 
In the Fiske, Kenney, and Taylor (1982) model, the task outcome 
would be considered a "salient aspect" of the situation. Subjects 
would attend to this information and encode schema-relevant aspects 
more deeply (i.e., at a semantic, individually meaningful level). 
Subsequent information would then be processed in an attenuated way, 
with cognitive schemata acting as filters. 
Similarly, Ingram (1984) has recently proposed an information-
processing analysis of depression. According to his model, an 
affective structure called a "depression-emotion node" can become 
activated, which in turn activates an associated network of depressive 
cognitions. These serve to maintain the depressive affect. The model 
seems entirely consistent with the present findings. 
Kuiper and Berry's (1981) notion of a "contrast effect" involves 
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a similar schona for nondepressives. According to these authors, 
nondepressives tend to see themselves under an "illusory warm glow," 
and interpret information about others in a self-consistent manner. 
Succeeding on a task may likewise have provided an activating event 
for nondepressed schemata, as the Mood x Feedback interaction 
suggests. Accordingly, neither depressed nor nondepressed subjects 
can be seen as operating "objectively" in making their causal 
attributions in this stucfy. 
Nor can it be said that depressives tend to ignore consensus 
information when making attributions, as Sharp and Tennen (1983) 
earlier suggested. In the Sharp and Tennen study depressed persons 
who jointly failed a task (together with a confederate) attributed a 
great deal of responsibility to themselves for the failure, and a 
relatively smaller amount to the confederate. But rather than failing 
to perceive the confederate's failure, the depressed subjects m^ have 
indeed processed it and, in turn, deepened their own sense of 
responsibility for the outcome. The present results suggest that 
depressed persons do not fail to perceive consensus information, but 
appear to interpret and utilize it in a way which differs from t±at of 
nondepressed persons. 
Attributions About Others' Performance 
The other-relevant pole of Kuiper and Derry's (1981) "contrast 
effect" (vAiich suggests t±at the nondepressed perceive others in a 
more negative light than do the depressed) was not strongly supported 
in this stu<ty. There was no main effect for mood in t±e other-
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referenced attributions. But self-other difference scores revealed 
that successful nondepressed subjects tended to self-enhance. That 
is, they attributed their own performance more internally than that of 
others whom they expected to perform successfully. Depressed subjects 
exhibited no such tendency. This corresponds with Kuiper's (1978) 
findings, reported earlier in this stucfy. 
In general, information from others (in the form of consensus 
information) proved to be more interesting than information about 
others (in the form of attributions about others' performances) in the 
present stucty. The present results are in accord with the Sween^r, 
Shaeffer, and Golin (1982) findings that depressed persons do not 
differ from nondepressed persons in their attributions about others' 
performances. 
Implications for the Treatment of Depression 
Foersterling (1985) recently reviewed the literature regarding 
attributional retraining. Although different theoretical perspectives 
are enplcyed (e.g., those of Bandura, Seligman, and Weiner), most of 
the programs in use tend to focus on reattribution of failure to lack 
of effort. In general, an encouraging level of success has been 
reported in effecting desired cognitive and behavioral changes. 
However, the programs do not target alleviation of depressive affect. 
Father, by reattributing failure to a lack of effort, the programs aim 
at increasing subjects' task persistence and improving their 
performance. TOius, increased utility of attributions is an 
intermediate goal, but Foersterling points out that attention is 
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generally not paid to increased accuracy of attributions in these 
programs. 
In a second article, Foersterling (1986) makes a distinction 
between attribution theories and attribution models. In considering 
the importance of cognitions (e.g., attributions) as an intervening 
variable between stimuli and responses (i.e., an "S-C-R" model, where 
"S" represents Stimuli, "C" represents Cognitions, and "R" represents 
Responses), Foersterling identifies attribution theories (e.g., 
Heider's and Kelley's) as concerned with the S-C link, and attribution 
models (e.g., Seligman's and Weiner's) as concerned with the C-R link. 
In other words, attribution theories explain how environmental events 
give rise to attributions, while attribution models explain how 
particular attributions lead to subsequent behaviors. Foersterling 
suggests that therapeutic change can result from attending to the 
sources of attributions, in a Kelley-like covariation analysis. He 
proposes that, consistent with the mental health tradition that 
reality-oriented cognitions are more functional than inaccurate 
cognitions (cf. Ellis, 1962), attending to covariation information 
will lead to more realistic attributions, and thence to therapeutic 
behavior change. 
Results of the present stucfy lend some qualified support to this 
notion. Prior to providing consensus information, depressed and 
nondepressed subjects processed behavioral outcanes in a discrepant 
way. This discrepancy was eliminated when consensus information was 
presented to subjects in a salient manner. Thus, attention to the "S" 
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on the part of subjects resulted in desirable changes in their "C's." 
Attribution models would then predict more functional responses on the 
part of these individuals. 
However, the present results also suggest a cautionary note. The 
notion of people as "amateur scientists" ferreting out reality through 
the use of covariation information does not appear to be warranted by 
the present data. Reality—vAiatever it may be—seems to be as elusive 
to the person on the street as it is to the jdiysicist. Covariation 
information (in the form of consensus feedback) did not have a unitary 
effect on the subjects in the present stu(fy. Instead, subjects seemed 
to process the information in a highly subjective and jiienonenal way. 
In considering the use of covariation information in an attributional 
retraining program, then, one might do well to be sensitive to the 
of information which will be provided, the mood of the persons to 
whom the information will be addressed, and the direction of the 
desired attributional change. Ultimately, one returns to a 
consideration of the utility of attributions and not of their accuracy 
or truthfulness. 
Finally, the finding that depressed persons attribute causes of 
outcomes more internally after receiving information about others' 
failures has an inportant implication for the maintenance of 
depression. Suppose an individual experiences an equal number of 
successes and failures in life. Learned helplessness theory predicts 
(and the present data support) that, if the individual is not 
depressed, s/he will make highly internal attributions for the 
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successes, as compared with the failures. Such an attributional style 
is likely to result in a great deal of affective buoyancy. But the 
present data also suggest that if the individual is depressed, his/her 
attributions will not differ significantly in internality, regardless 
of the outcomes. Therefore, the person is less likely to develop the 
nondepressive's resiliency. 
In order to develop a resilience similar to the nondepressive*s, 
the depressed individual must begin to make internal attributions for 
his or her successes. But the Mood x Feedback interaction in the 
present data suggests that these internal attributions for a depressed 
individual are more likely to occur in connection with consensus 
information that relevant others have failed at similar tasks. 
However, information about peers' failures is much more likely to be 
hidden than information about their successes. The success 
information which peers are more prone to broadcast, though, is likely 
to be associated with the depressed person making more external 
attributions about his/her outcomes. Thus the depressed individual is 
precluded from developing a sense of buoyancy because of the bias in 
the processing of consensus information. 
The reverse, of course, holds true for the nondepressed person. 
Already making internal attributions for success, the ample 
information in the environment about others' successes only serves to 
support internality and maintain a sense of vitality and resilience. 
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Limitations of the Present Study 
Limitations of the present stucty involve external sources of 
invalidity v^ich restrict the generalizability of these findings. As 
discussed above, perhaps the most serious limitation is the present 
stucfy's focus on relatively functional, college-age students. A 
different pattern of Mood x Outcome interaction might have resulted, 
for instance, had the depressed group been more severely depressed. A 
second limitation is this stu(ty's use of a cognitive task (anagrams) 
to generate causal attributions and social comparisons. While such a 
task is likely to be particularly ego-involving for college students, 
tasks like this might not be so relevant for the population in 
general. Again, different patterns of attributions might have 
resulted had the task been a jdiysical one, a social one, or an 
emotional one—or one calling for a variety of different skills. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Suggestions for future research would include studies aimed at 
extending and generalizing these findings. Do they apply to a more 
severely depressed group? Would similar findings result from a 
social/emotional success or failure experience, or from a physical 
task? Do depressives differ from normals in processing 
distinctiveness or consistency information? Does consensus 
information have a similar effect if it is presented prior to outcome 
information—or if the order of presentation of both kinds of 
information is counterbalanced? 
Another interesting line of research might involve moving beyond 
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attributions in the S-C-R chain. Ihis would involve looking at the 
effect of consensus (or other covariation) information (the "S's") on 
various dependent measures ("R*s") which one might expect to change 
when attributions change. Such studies could use the same 
classification variables as the present stu^, but different dependent 
measures. These latter would involve behavioral outcomes 
theoretically associated with attributional changes, such as task 
persistence, improved performance, improved self-esteem, and various 
affective changes. 
Wilson and Linville (1985), for example, found that fewer low-GPA 
Freshman subjects dropped out of college after learning that other 
students (confederates) #o performed poorly in their Freshman year 
improved their grades in their So^omore, Junior, and Senior years. 
These subjects also improved their grades and reported improved moods 
after getting this consensus information, ûie might assume that these 
students' attributions about their abilities also changed, but the 
authors "moved beyond" attributions in the S-C-R chain and assessed 
responses directly. 
lîie application of attribution theories to clinical problems has 
obviously begun to show great promise. As medicine moves tward 
utilizing our internal biochemistry in a medicinal way to canbat 
disease processes, perh^s pi^chology can similarly begin to onploy 
our innate capacity for making causal attributions—the "naive 
psychologist" within each of us—to help us cope more effectively with 
the challenges life presents. 
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"...it don't change the world, 
but you can't say it ain't there." 
—Jack Nicholson 
Rolling Stone 
August 14, 1986 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for depressed and nondepressed 
experimental groups 
Variable Depressed group (n=58) Nondepressed group (n=55) 
s.d.b M s.d. 
J-F score. 61.7 10.1 45.9* •8.2 
BDI score 15.2 5.9 2.1* 1.3 
DACL score 16.1 6.4 5.2* 4.6 
Sex (male=0; female=l) .6 0.7 .4 (n.s.) 0.7 
Age 19.1 0.2 19.5 (n.s.) 0.2 
Grade 12.7 0.2 13.2 (n.s.) 0.2 
^M=Arithmetic mean. 
^s.d.=standard deviation. 
^Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale, score range 25 to 91. 
^Beck Depression Inventory, score range 0 to 39. 
^Depression Adjective Check List, Form E, score range 0 to 27. 
*E <.0001 
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Table 2. Numbers of subjects in experimental cells 
Depressed Nondepressed 
Success 
outcome 
Failure 
outcome 
Success 
outcome 
Failure Total 
outcome (row) 
Success 
feedback 14 21 10 16 61 
Failure 
feedback 13 10 16 13 52 
Total 
(column) 27 31 26 29 
Total 
(mood) 58 55 N=113 
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Table 3. Summary of analysis of variance of self-referenced 
attribution scores, prior to consensus information 
Source df SS (Type III) MS I 
Model 3 370.51 123.50 7 .20** 
Mood 1 27.36 27.36 1 .60 
Outccme 1 272.05 272.05 15 .06*** 
Mood X Outcome 1 82.93 82.93 4 .86* 
Error 109 1858.48 17.05 
Corrected total 112 2228.99 
Note. R^=.17. 
*E <.05 
**E <.0005 
***E <.0001 
Table 4. Means of Mood x Outcome interaction for self-referenced 
attributions, plus pairwise comparisons of means 
Mood Outcome Mean # Probability that mean^=mean^ 
for mean 1 2 3 4® 
Depressed Fail 14.10 1 — 
Depressed Succeed 12.70 2 .2027 
Nondepressed Fail 14.83 3 .4947 .0570 
Nondepressed Succeed 10.00 4 .0003* .0189 .0001* 
^i.e., probability of a larger absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that mean^ (row mean) equals mean^ (column mean). 
*E is < that required for significance using Bonferroni's procedure 
(i.e., E <.008). 
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Table 5. Summary of analysis of variance of other-referenced 
attribution scores, prior to consensus information 
Source df SS (I^ III) MS 
Model 3 203.12 67.71 4.18* 
Mood 1 0.10 0.10 0.01 
Outcome 1 200.45 200.45 12.37** 
Mood X Outcome 1 3.85 3.85 0.24 
Error 109 1765.98 16.20 
Corrected total 112 1969.10 
Note. R^=.10. 
*E <.01 
**E <.001 
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Table 6. Summary of analysis of variance on self-other attributional 
difference scores, prior to consensus information 
Source df SS (Type III) MS £ 
Model 3 82.02 27.34 1.35 
Mood 1 
Outcome 1 
Mood X Outcome 1 
30.76 
5.46 
51.05 
30.76 
5.46 
51.05 
1.52 
0.27 
2.51 
Error 109 2212.44 20.30 
Corrected total 112 2294.46 
Note. R^=.04. 
Table 7. Means of self-other attributional difference scores, plus 
pairwise comparisons of means 
Mood Outcome Mean # E=0^ E that mean^=mean^ 
for mean 1 2 3 4^ 
Depressed Failure -1.13° 1 .1658 ' 
Depressed Success -0.22 2 .7982 .4462 
Nondepressed Failure -0.83 3 .3248 .7961 .6164 
NOndepressed Success -2.62 4 .0038 .2174 .0558 .1446 
^Probability of obtaining a larger absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that the mean is equal to zero. 
^Probability of obtaining a larger absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that mean^ (row mean)=mean^ (column mean). 
negative number signifies that attributions about others are more 
external than attributions about self. 
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Table 8. Crosstabulation of subjects' predictions of others' 
outcones, by subjects' own outcomes (controlled for mood) 
I. Depressed Mood 
Subjects' predictions 
Others fail I Others succeed 
Failure n=23 
Subjects', 
outcomes 
Success n=2 
n=8 
n=24 
II. Nondepressed Mood 
Subjects' predictions 
Others fail 
Failure n=19 
Subjects', 
outcomes 
Success n=0 
Others succeed 
n=10 
n=26 
®Chi-square with 1 df=25.397; g <.0001. 
'^Chi-square with 1 df=26.025; p <.0001. 
Note. Frequency distributions do not vary by mood (Breslow-Day test 
for homogeneity of the odds ratios; Chi-square with 1 df=1.36; 
E <.25). 
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Table 9. Results of the analysis of variance on "defensive" 
scores 
Source df SS (Type III) MS P 
Model 3 16.91 5.64 0.38 
Mood 1 5.89 5.89 0.39 
Outcome 1 10.09 10.09 0.67 
Mood X Outcome 1 0.36 0.36 0.02 
Error 108 1620.58 15.01 
Corrected total 111 1637.49 
Note. R^=.01. 
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Table 10. Results of the analysis of variance on self-referenced 
attribution scores, following consensus information 
Source df SS (%e III) MS P 
Model 7 721, .87 103, .12 6 .18* 
Mood 1 0, .09 0, .09 0. 01 
Outcome 1 283, .62 283. 62 17. 00* 
Feedback 1 27. 54 27. 54 1. 65 
Mood X Outcome 1 45. 76 45. 76 2. 74 
Mood X Feedback 1 361. 01 361. 01 21. 64* 
Outcome X Feedback 1 1. 37 1. 37 0. 08 
Mood X Outcome x Feedback 1 23. 17 23. 17 1. ,39 
Error 104 1734. 91 16. 68 
Corrected total 111 2456. ,78 
Note. R^=.29. 
<.0001 
Table 11. Means of self-referenced attributions following consensus 
information, for the Mood x Outcome interaction 
Mood Outcome Prefeedback mean Postfeedback mean Difference 
Depressed Failure 14.10 14.29 +0.19^ 
Depressed Success 12.70 11.81 -0.89 
Nondepressed Failure 14.83 14.76 -0.07 
Nondepressed Success 10.00 10.88 +0.88 
Note. None of the differences reaches significance at g <.05. 
signifies a change away from externality, while a "+" signifies 
a change toward externality. 
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Table 12, Means of self-referenced attributions following consensus 
information, for the Mood x Feedback interaction 
Mood Feedback Mean # 2 of a greater lil under the 
that mean^=mean^, for mean #: 
1 2 3 4® 
Depressed Failure 11.32 1 — 
Depressed Success 14.31 2 .0191 
NOndepressed Failure 14.83 3 .0016* .3018 
NOndepressed Success 10.81 4 .4247 .0011* .0001* 
Probability of obtaining a greater absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that the row mean is equal to the column mean. 
*E is < that required for significance using the Bonferroni procedure 
(i.e., E <.008). 
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I 
Success 
a 
Depressed 
Failure 
Feedback 
A 
Nondepressed 
Figure 3. flood x Feedback interaction, following consensus feedback 
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Table 13. Least squares means of self-referenced attributions 
following consensus information, for the Outcome x Feedback 
interaction 
Outcome Feedback Mean # g of a greater It 1 under the 
that mean^=meang, for mean #; 
1 2 3 "4® 
Failure Failure 15.39 1 — 
Failure Success 13.97 2 .2570 
Success Failure 11.61 3 .0032* .0315 
Success Success 11.04 4 .0006* .0059* .4922 
^Probability of obtaining a greater absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that the row mean is equal to the column mean. 
*E is < that required for significance using the Bonferroni procedure 
(i.e., 2 <.008). 
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Table 14. Means of self-referenced attributions following consensus 
information for the three-way interaction of Mood x Outcome 
X Feedback 
Cell Mean g of a greater ltl under the that mean^=mean^f for mean 
1^ 12.00 
2 10.75 .4764 
3 15.38 .0335 .0022 
4 12.71 .6736 .2243 .0612 
5 18.00 .0007* .0001* .0721 .0011* 
6 12.25 .8796 .3384 .0229 .7567 .0003* 
7 12.12 .9396 .3800 .0181 .6942 .0002* .9312 
8 8.70 .0737 .2438 .0001* .0194 .0001* .0334 .0400 
*g is < that required for significance using the Bonferroni procedure 
(i.e., E <.0017). 
®Cells are numbered as follows; 
Cell number Mood Outcome Feedback 
1 Depressed Failure Failure 
2 Depressed Success Failure 
3 Depressed Failure Success 
4 Depressed Success Success 
5 Nondepressed Failure Failure 
6 Nondepressed Success Failure 
7 Nondepressed Failure Success 
8 Nondepressed Success Success 
Note. Cell numbers correspond with those displayed in the "Method" 
section of this paper, page 61. 
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Table 15. Results of the analysis of variance on other-referenced 
attributions, following consensus information 
Source df SS (Type III) MS F 
Model 7 501.53 71. ,65 4, .11**** 
Mood 1 7.66 7. 66 0. 44 
CXitcome 1 152.79 152. 79 8. 76*** 
Feedback 1 177.77 177. 77 10. 19*** 
Mood X Outcome 1 9.91 9. 91 0. 57 
Mood X Feedback 1 117.90 117. 90 6. 76** 
Outcome X Feedback 1 86.51 86. 51 4. 96* 
Mood X Outcome x Feedback 1 1.91 1. 91 0. ,11 
Error 104 1814.43 17. 45 
Corrected total 111 2315.96 
Note. R^=.22. 
*E <.05 
**E <.01 
***E <.005 
****E <.0005 
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Table 16. Means of other-referenced attributions following consensus 
information, for the Outcome x Feedback interaction 
Outcome Feedback Mean # p of a greater It I under the H 
that mean^=mean_, for mean #: 
1 ^ 2 ^  3  4 ®  
Failure Failure 16.78 1 
Failure Success 12.38 2 .0002* 
Success Failure 12.54 3 .0006* .8584 
Success Success 11.96 4 .0001* .5927 .5068 
^Probability of obtaining a greater absolute value of i under the 
hypothesis that the row mean is equal to the column mean. 
*E is < that required for significance using Bonferroni's procedure 
(i.e., p is <.008). 
Table 17. Means of other-referenced attributions following consensus 
information, for the Mood x Feedback interaction 
Mood Feedback Mean # p of a greater |t| under the 
that mean^=9nean^, for mean #: 
1 2 3 4® 
Depressed Failure 13.59 1 
Depressed Success 13.26 2 .6762 
Nondepressed Failure 15.10 3 .1880 .0559 
Nondepressed Success 10.81 4 .0123 .0187 .0001* 
^Probability of obtaining a greater absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that the row mean is equal to the column mean. 
*E is < that required for significance using Bonferroni's procedure 
(i.e., p is <.008). 
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Table 18. Results of the analysis of variance on self-other 
attributional differences following consensus information 
Source df SS (Type III) MS P 
Model 7 295.26 42.18 2.82** 
Mood 1 9.39 9.39 0.63 
OutcOTie 1 20.07 20.07 1.34 
Feedback 1 65.37 65.37 4.37* 
Mood X Outcome 1 13.08 13.08 0.87 
Mood X Feedback 1 66.29 66.29 4.43* 
Outcome X Feedback 1 66.14 66.14 4.42* 
Mood X Outcome x Feedback 1 38.38 38.38 2.57 
Error 104 1555.80 14.96 
Corrected total 111 1851.06 
Note. R^=.16. 
<.05 
**£ <.01 
163 
Table 19. Means of self-other attributional difference scores 
following consensus information, plus pairwise conparisons 
of means for Mood x Feedback interaction 
Mood Feedback Mean # E=0^ E that mean^=m)ean^ 
for mean 12 3 4^ 
Depressed Failure -2.39G 1 .0047 — 
Depressed Success 0.76 2 .2561 .0037* 
Nondepressed Failure -0.21 3 .7676 .0501 .3232 
Nondepressed Success -0.22 4 .7734 .0595 .3384 .9917 -
Probability of obtaining a larger absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that the mean is equal to zero. 
^Probability of obtaining a larger absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that mean^ (row mean)=mean^ (column mean). 
represents a change awav from externality. 
*E is < that required for significance using Bonferroni's procedure 
(i.e., E <.008). 
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Table 20. Means of self-other attributional difference scores 
following consensus information, plus pairwise comparisons 
of means for Feedback x Outcome interaction 
Outcone Feedback Mean # E=0* E that mean^=mean^ 
for mean 1 2 3 4^ 
Failure Failure -1.66° 1 .0441 — 
Failure Success 1.49 2 .0218 .0030* 
Success Failure -0.95 3 .2022 .5197 .0141 
Success Success -0.96 4 .2347 .5407 .0187 .9933 
^Probability of obtaining a larger absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that the mean is equal to zero. 
^Probability of obtaining a larger absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that mean^ (row mean)=mean^ (column mean). 
represents a change awav from externality. 
*E is < that required for significance using Bonferroni's procedure 
(i.e., p is <.008). 
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Table 21. Means of self-other differences in attributions following 
consensus information for the three-way interaction of Mood 
X Outcome x Feedback 
Mood Outcome Feedback Mean Probability that the mean 
equals from zero 
Depressed Failure Failure -3. 70^ .0031* 
Depressed Failure Success 2. ,23 .0093 
Depressed Success Failure -1. 08 .3342 
Depressed Success Success -0. 71 .4911 
Nondepressed Failure Failure 0. 38 .7207 
Nondepressed Failure Success 0. 75 .4397 
Nondepressed Success Failure -0. 81 .4027 
Nondepressed Success Success -1. 20 .3288 
represents a change away from externality. 
*E is < that required for significance using Bonferroni's procedure 
(i.e., E is <.006). 
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Table 22. Results of the analysis of variance on self-referenced 
attributions following consensus information, using pre-
feedback scores as covariates 
Source df SS (Type III) MS 
Model 8 1351. 81 168. 98 15. 75** 
Covariate 1 629. 94 629. 94 58. 72** 
Mood 1 6. 19 6. 19 0. 58 
Outcome 1 38. 53 38. 53 3. 59 
Feedback 1 13. 59 13. 59 1. 27 
Mood X Outcome 1 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 
Mood X Feedback 1 96. 83 96. 83 9. 03* 
Outcome X Feedback 1 0. 46 0. 46 0. 04 
Mood X Outcome x Feedback 1 5. 80 5. 80 0. 54 
Error 103 1104. 97 10. 73 
Corrected total 111 2456. 78 
Note. R^=.55. 
*2 <.005 
**E <.0001 
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Table 23. Means of self-referenced attributions following consensus 
information, for the Mood x Feedback interaction 
(controlling for prefeedback attributions) 
Mood Feedback Mean # p=0^ p of a greater It I under the 
that mean^=inean^ for mean # 
1 2 3 4b 
Depressed Failure 0.32 1 .1571 
Depressed Success 3.31 2 .0001** .1586 
Nondepressed Failure 3.83 3 .0001** .0092 .1515 
Nondepressed Success 0.19 4 .2764 .8106 .0948 .0042* — 
^Probability of abtaining a larger absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that the mean is equal to zero. 
^Probability of obtaining a greater absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that the row mean is equal to the column mean. 
*P is < that required for significance using Bonferroni's procedure 
(i.e., E is <.0125). 
**E is < that required for significance using Bonferroni's procedure 
(i.e., E is <.008). 
168 
Table 24. Results of the analysis of variance on other-referenced 
attributions following consensus information, using pre-
feedback scores as covariates 
Source df SS (Type III) MS P 
Model 8 932. 77 116. 
o
 
vo 
8. 68** 
Covariate 1 431. 23 431. 23 32. 11** 
Mood 1 11. 92 11. 92 0, 89 
Outcome 1 31. 36 31. 36 2. 33 
Feedback 1 181. 63 181. 63 13. 52* 
Mood X Outcome 1 0. 40 0. 40 0. 03 
Mood X Feedback 1 41. 23 41. 23 3. 07 
Outcome x Feedback 1 188. 33 188. 33 14. 02* 
Mood X Outcome x Feedback 1 10. 83 10. 83 0. 81 
Error 103 1383. 20 13. 43 
Corrected total 111 2315. 97 
Note. R^=.40. 
*B <.0005 
**E <.0001 
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Table 25. Means of other-referenced attributions following consensus 
information, for the Outcome x Feedback interaction 
(controlling for prefeedback attributions) 
Outcome Feedback Mean # p of a greater |t| under the 
that mean„=mean for mean # 
1 2 3 4^ 
Failure Failure 5.68 1 
Failure Success 0.32 2 .0001* 
Success Failure 1.80 3 .0003* .1243 
Success Success 1.92 4 .0009* .1301 .9106 
Probability of obtaining a greater absolute value of t under the 
hypothesis that the row mean is equal to the column mean. 
*p is < that required for significance using Bonferroni's procedure 
(i.e., E <.008). 
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APPENDIX B; 
SELECTION OP THE MOST RELIABLE SUBSETS OP ATTRIBUTION ITEMS 
(Coefficient alpha has been calculated based on the average interitem 
correlation.) 
I. Prefeedback ratings of own externality—interitem correlations 
A. Two-item set 
Items Correlation 
1 . 2  .223 
1.3 .061 
1.4 .313 coefficient alpha=.477 
1.5 .011 
2.3 .094 
2.4 .201 
2.5 .018 
3.4 -.171 
3.5 .026 
4,5 .207 
Note. ANOVAs were run using the most reliable subset of items 
in those analyses where this measure could be used (i.e., attributions 
regarding self and others prior to receiving consensus feedback, and 
attributions regarding self and others after receiving the feedback). 
In addition, ANOVA's were run using only the single Attribution Style 
Questionnaire-type item, and using only the four Weiner-type items. 
Through this method it was discovered that using all five items 
resulted in no loss of significant or main effects or interactions, as 
compared with using various subsets of the items. In other words, 
each main effect or interaction which proved significant using subsets 
of the five items also proved significant when all five items were 
used as the dependent measure. 
highest interitem correlation of set. 
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B. Three-item set 
Items 
1.2.3 
1.2.4 
1.2.5 
1.3.4 
1.3.5 
1,4,5 
2.3.4 
2.3.5 
2,4,5 
3,4,5 
C. Four-item set 
Items 
1.2.3.4 
1.2.3.5 
1,2,4,5 
2,3,4,5 
Items 
Correlation 
•b 
.246 coefficient alpha=.495 
.084 
.068 
.033 
.177 
.041 
.046 
.142 
.021 
Correlation 
.120 
.072. 
.162 coefficient alpha=.436 
.062 
Correlation 
.098^ coefficient al^a=.352 
^Highest coefficient alpha of the entire group of sets for 
each experimental cell. 
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II. Prefeedback ratings of others' externality—interitem 
correlations 
A. Two-item set 
Items Correlation 
1,2 .220 
1,3 .191 
lr4 .146 
1,5 -.085 
2.3 .1061 . 
2.4 .385 coefficient alpha=.556 
2.5 -.130 
3.4 .040 
3.5 .137 
B. Three-item set 
Items Correlation 
1.2.3 .173 
1.2.4 .250 coefficient alpha=.500 
1.2.5 .002 
1.3.4 .126 
1.4.5 .066 
C. Four-item set 
Items Correlation 
1.2.3.4 .182^ coefficient alpha=.471 
1.2.3.5 .045 
1,2,4,5 .112 
2,3,4,5 .085 
D. Five-it an set 
Items Correlation 
1,2,3,4,5 .098^ coefficient alpha=.352 
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III. Postfeedback ratings of own externality—interitem correlations 
A. Two-item set 
Items Correlation 
1,2 .162 
1.3 .087. 
1.4 .346 coefficient alpha=.514 
1.5 .192 
2.3 .119 
2.4 .186 
2.5 -.006 
3.4 -.097 
3.5 .054 
4,5 .258 
B. Three-item set 
Items Correlation 
1.2.3 .123 
1.2.4 .231 
1.2.5 .116 
1.3.4 .112. . 
1.4.5 .265^ coefficient alpha=.520'^ 
2.3.4 .069 
2.3.5 .056 
2,4,5 .146 
3,4,5 .072 
C. Four-item set 
Items Correlation 
1.2.3.4 .134 
1.2.3.5 .101 
1,2,4,5 .190 coefficient alpha=.484 
2,3,4,5 .086 
D. Five-item set 
1,2,3,4,5 .130^ coefficient alpha=.428 
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IV. Postfeedback ratings of others' externality—interitem 
correlations 
A. Two-item set 
Items Correlation 
1.2 .253 
1.3 .199^ 
1.4 .490 coefficient alpha=.658' 
1.5 .130 
2.3 -.047 
2.4 .437 
2.5 -.093 
3.4 .103 
3.5 .097 
4,5 .125 
B. Three-item set 
Itgns Correlation 
1.2.3 .135^ , 
1.2.4 .393 coefficient alpha=.660 
1.2.5 .097 
1.3.4 .264 
1.3.5 .142 
1,4,5 .248 
2.3.4 .164 
2.3.5 -.014 
2,4,5 .156 
3,4,5 .108 
C. Four-item set 
Items Correlation 
1.2.3.4 .239^ coefficient al£dia=.557 
1.2.3.5 .090 
1,2,4,5 .224 
2,3,4,5 .104 
D. Five-item set 
Items 
1,2,3,4,5 
Correlation 
.169^ coefficient alpha=.504 
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APPENDIX C; 
RESULTS OF ANOVAS INCLUDING SEX AS A MAIN EFFECT 
ANOVAs of dependent attributional variables with sex included as an 
independent variable. Sum of all five attribution items has been used 
to calculate dependent variables. 
I. Prefeedback self ratings 
Source df SS (Type III) MS F 
Model 4 400, 83 100. 21 5. ,92** 
Sex 1 30. 32 30. 32 1. ,79 
Mood 1 31. 68 31. 68 1. ,87 
Outcome 1 265. 86 265. 86 15. 71*** 
Mood X Outcome 1 76. 97 76. 97 4. ,55* 
Error 108 1828. 16 16. 93 
Corrected total 112 2228. 99 
Note. R^=.180. 
*E <.05 
**E <.0005 
***Q <.0001 
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II. Prefeedback other ratings 
Source df SS (Type III) MS F 
Model 4 222. 26 55.56 3. 44* 
Sex 1 19. 14 19.14 1. 18 
Mood 1 0. 00 0.00 0. 00 
Outcome 1 196. 21 196.21 12. 13** 
Mood X Outcome 1 2. 91 2.91 0. 18 
Error 108 1746. 84 16.17 
Corrected total 112 1969. 10 
Note. R^=.113. 
*E <.05 
**E <.001 
III. Postfeedback self ratings 
Source df SS (Type III) MS P 
Model 8 722 .72 90. 34 5. 37* 
Sex 1 0 .85 0. 85 0. 05 
Mood 1 0 .14 0. 14 0. 01 
Outcome 1 283 .82 283. 82 16. 86* 
Feedback 1 28. 03 28. 03 1. 66 
Mood X Outcome 1 46. 50 46. 50 2. 76 
Mood X Feedback 1 361. 80 361. 80 21. 49* 
Outcome X Feedback 1 1. 32 1. 32 0. 08 
Mood X Outcome x Feedback 1 24. 01 24. 01 1. 43 
Error 103 1734. 06 16. 84 
Corrected total 111 2456. 78 
*E <.0001 
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IV. Postfeedback other ratings 
Source df SS (Type III) MS F 
Model 8 640 .48 80. 06 4. 79** 
Sex 1 31 .98 31. 98 1. 91 
Mood 1 12 .82 12. 82 0. 77 
Outcome 1 0 .01 0. 01 0. 00 
Feedback 1 193 .96 193. 96 11. 61* 
Mood X Outcome 1 1 .37 1. 37 0. 08 
Mood X Feedback 1 7 .71 7. 71 0. 46 
Outcome X Feedback 1 337 .91 337. 91 20. 23** 
Mood X Outcome x Feedback 1 16 .04 16. 04 0. 96 
Error 103 1720 .44 16. 70 
Corrected total 111 2360 .92 
*E <.001 
**E <.0001 
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APPENDIX D: 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
FOR SCREENING MEASURES AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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Frequency distribution of scores on the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) N=626 
GDI score Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 32 5.1 5.1 
1 43 6.9 12.0 
2 40 6.4 18.4 
3 59 9.4 27.8 
4 55 8.8 36.6 
5 46 7.3 43.9 
6 53 8.5 52.4 
7 44 7.0 59.4 
8 34 5.4 64.9 
9 28 4.5 69.3 
10 36 5.8 75.1 
11 32 5.1 80.2 
12 15 2.4 82.6 
13 20 3.2 85.8 
14 13 2.1 87.9 
15 9 1.4 89.3 
16 11 1.8 . 91.1 
17 7 1.1 92.2 
18 8 1.3 93.5 
19 6 1.0 94.4 
20 7 1.1 95.5 
21 4 0.6 96.2 
22 5 0.8 97.0 
23 2 0.3 97.3 
24 3 0.5 97.8 
25 3 0.5 98.2 
26 1 0.2 98.4 
27 2 0.3 98.7 
28 1 0.2 98.9 
29 1 0.2 99.0 
30 2 0.3 99.4 
36 1 0.2 99.5 
38 2 0.3 99.8 
39 1 0.2 100.0 
Note. Overall mean for experimental subjects (N=113) was 8.6; 
standard deviation was 7.8. 
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Frequency distribution of scores on the Janis-Field Feelings of 
Inadequacy Scale (J-F) N=626 
J-F Score Range Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
25-30 13 2.1 2.1 
31-35 24 3.8 5.9 
36-40 49 7.8 13.7 
41-45 97 15.5 29.2 
46-50 102 16.3 45.5 
51-55 113 18.1 63.6 
56-60 85 13.6 77.2 
61-65 57 9.1 86.3 
66-70 36 5.7 92.0 
71-75 30 4.7 96.8 
76-80 11 1.9 98.6 
81-85 4 0.7 99.2 
86-90 4 0.7 99.8 
91 1 0.2 100.0 
Note. Overall mean for experimental subjects (N=113) was 54.0; 
standard deviation was 12.1. 
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Means, standard deviations of dependent variables 
I. Attributions regarding own performance, prior to consensus 
feedback (not transformed) 
Depressed 
Success 
outcome 
Failure 
outcome 
Nondepressed 
Success 
outcome 
Failure 
outcome 
Total 
(row) 
Success 2.05, 
feedback 2.36, 4.11 4.00, 4.02 -2.40, 2.95 2.00, 3.58 4.27 
Failure 1.96, 
feedback 1.00, 3.29 1.20, 3.08 -0.12, 3.40 6.08, 6.05 4.72 
Total 
(column) 1.70, 3.73 3.10, 3.93 -1.00, 3.37 3.83, 5.18 
Total 
(mood) 2.45, 3.87 1.55, 5.01 
Total—success outcome 0.38, 3.78 Total—failure outccxne 3.45, 4.55 
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II. Attributions regarding others' performance, prior to consensus 
feedback (not transformed) 
Depressed Nondepressed 
Success Failure Success Failure Total 
outcome outcome outcome outcone (row) 
Success 3.44, 
feedback 1.57, 4.18 1.40, 5.04 0.00, 2.75 4.44, 4.44 4.51 
Failure 2.88. 
feedback 2.31, 3.47 1.40, 5.04 2.62, 3.14 4.92, 3.38 3.81 
Total 
(column) 1.93, 3.80 4.23, 4.82 1.62, 3.21 4.66, 3.94 
Total 
(mood) 3.16, 4.49 3.22, 3.90 
Total—success outcane 1.77, 3.50 Total—failure outccsne 4.43, 4.39 
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III. Attributions regarding own performance, following consensus 
feedback (not transformed) 
Depressed Nondepressed 
Success Failure Success Failure Total 
outcome outcome outcome outcone (row) 
Success 1.82, 
feedback 1.71, 4.84 4.38, 3.99 -2.30, 3.06 1.12, 3.56 4.50 
Failure 2.31, 
feedback-0.25, 3.67 1.00, 2.71 1.25, 4.81 7.00, 4.80 4.97 
Total 
(column) 0.81, 3.58 3.29, 3.93 -0.16, 4.51 3.76, 5.05 
Total 
(mood) 2.16, 4.28 1.93, 5.14 
Total—success outcome 0.35, 4.42 Total—failure outcome 3.52, 4.47 
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IV. Attributions regarding others' performance, following consensus 
feedback (not transformed) 
Depressed Nondepressed 
Success Failure Success Failure Total 
outcome outcome outcome outcome (row) 
Success 1.21, 
feedback 2.43, 4.96 2.14, 4.54 -1.10, 2.33 0.38, 2.31 4.01 
Failure 3.45 
feedback 0.83, 2.82 4.70, 5.36 2.06, 4.86 6.62, 4.59 4.92 
Total 
(column) 1.69, 4.12 2.97, 4.88 0.85, 4.31 3.17, 4.68 
Total 
(mood) 2.39, 4.55 2.07, 4.62 
Total—success outcome 1.27, 4.20 Total—failure outcome 3.07, 4.74 
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APPENDIX E: 
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH COMMITTEE MATERIALS 
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INFORMATION ON THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH 
IOWA 6TATE UNIVERSITY 
(Please fo l low the accompanying Inst ruct ions for  complet ing th is  form.)  
T i t le  of  pro ject  (p lease type) :  /A/ '  T/4 V A /  fU 6 '  / ! 'F  ^  0^ 
©I  agree to provide the proper survei l lance of  th is  pro ject  to  insure that  the r ights 
and wel fare of  the human subjects are proper ly  protected.  Addi t ions to or  changes 
in  procedures af fect ing the subjects af ter  the pro ject  has been approved wi l l  be 
submit ted to the commit tee for  rev iew. n /  .  p.  .  
nVrl; : h A. UllUi^L. 
Typed Named o f  Pr inc ipal  Invest  I  gator  Date Signature of  Pr inc ipal  Invest  igator  
I ^ 1^4A/ 6Li. 7^^ 
Campus Address Campus Telephone 
^3.)  Signatures of  others ( i f  any)  Date Relat ionship to Pr inc ipal  Invest igator  
P ^ 4 Uv? 61} 
A' l lALH ai l  dc ld ' l  I !  (A)  descr  ID I f ig  your '^pr^osei  resea^ch^an^^^s ' )  the 
subjects to  be used,  (C) ind icat ing any r isks or  d iscomfor ts  to  the subjects,  and 
(D) cover ing any topics checked below. CHECK a l l  boxes appl icable.  
I  I  Medical  c learance necessary before subjects can par t ic ipate 
I  I  Samples (b lood,  t issue,  etc. )  f rom subjects 
I  I  Administ rat ion of  substances ( foods,  drugs,  etc . )  to  subjects 
I  I  Physical  exerc ise or  condi t ioning for  subjects 
Decept ion of  subjects 
I  I  Subjects under 14 years of  age and(or)  Q]  Subjects 14-17 years of  age 
I  I  Subjects in  inst i tu t ions 
I  I  Research must  be approved by another  inst i tu t ion or  agency 
r  5-)  ATTACH an example of  the mater ia l  to  be used to  obta in informed consent  f ind CHECK 
which type wi l l  be used.  
Signed informed consent  wi l l  be obta ined.  
I  I  Modi f ied informed consent  wi l l  be obta ined.  
© M o n t h  D a y  Y e a r _  
Ant ic ipated date on which subjects wi l l  be f i rs t  contacted:  ^  
Ant ic ipated date for  last  contact  wi th subjects:  /  JL 22 
r  7 1  I f  Appl icable:  Ant ic ipated date on which audio or  v isual  tapes wi l l  be erased and(or)  
identifiers will be removed from completed survey Instruments:  ^ "XX 
Month Day Year 
8^ Signature,-9? Header MrDate Department  or  Administ rat ive Uni t  
TsJ Decis ion of  the OnTve^i ty  Commft tee on the Ose o f  H^an Subjects Tn^esearch:  
Project  Approved Q Project  not  approved Q No act ion required 
f- Kara: , 
Name of  Commit tee Chairperson 6ate\  S ignature of  Commit tee Chairperson 
Revised 5/78 
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INFORMATION ON THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH 
IOWA 5TATE UNIVERSITY 
(Please fo l low the accompanying Inst ruct ions for  complet ing th is  form.)  
T i t le  of  pro ject  (p lease type) :  j ' / /y  v . -T A T) |  r  J  ;  (  • / • " 'cv i . iV, '  
:  I L L  ; T / - 3  \ ' C .  r  . I w M N  r  A  ^  ; h s " )  
I agree to provide the proper survei l lance of  th is  pro ject  to  insure that  the r ignts 
and wel fare of  the human subjects are proper ly  protected.  Addi t ions to or  changes 
in  procedures af fect ing the subjects af ter  the pro ject  has been approved wi l l  be 
s ' jsmi t ted to the commit tee for  rev iew. ^ i  ,  
!  ^A V '  5  A'  i i ' )  I  L '  ^ /s  S • ; JA-<-•  • ( -  ' - l -
Tspec:  Named of  Pr inc ipal  Invest igator  Date Signature of  Pr inc ipal  Invest igator  
l : I  \  ' I  ; v y - / 7 4 v  
Campus Address Campus Telephone 
( 3 . )  Signatures of  others ( i f  any)  Date Relat ionship to Pr inc ipal  Invest igator  
( { ' / - V ; '  J ' W o  / -  -
Ù 1 - T A u ' i i  i -Snsl '  yb ja(3)  (A)  ufcs i  ' f  ? t )  I  ng your propuàed re ' i ' îùrch"  I - r ,d ( l i )  the 
àuo. 'ects to  be used,  (C) inu icat ing any r isks or  d i  sco: i fc ; - ts  to  the subj-c ts ,  ana 
(D) cover ing any topics chocked below. CHECK a l l  boxes appl icable.  
[  I  Medical  c learance necessary before subjects can par t ic ipate 
Samples (b lood,  t issue,  etc. )  f rom subjects 
j  Adnm i  s t  rat  ion of  substances ( foods,  orugs,  etc . )  to subjects 
• i • 'hys ical  exerc ' - ja  or  condi t ioning for  subjects 
[T j  Decept ion of  subjects 
[2] Subjects under 14 years of age and(or) Q Subjects 14-1? years of age 
I  1  Subjects in  Inst i tu t ions 
Research must  be approved by another  inst i tu t ion or  agency 
A T f A C h  an example of  the mater ia!  to  be used to obta in in forred consent  ^nd CHECK 
.vr .  ich type , ' i  !  1 be u ied.  
pT? Siared Informed consent  wi l l  be obta ined.  
Q Modi f ied informed ccnsent  wi l l  be obta ined.  
© M o n t h  D a y  Y e a r  
Ant ic ipated date on which subjects wi l l  b: ' .  f i rs t  contacted:  ' /  "Y '  ~  
A- , t ic ip j ted date for  last  contact  wi th subjects:  /  .1  Y2;  
( ] . .  I f  A p p l i c a b l e :  A n t l c l p J i c d  d a t e  o n  w h i c h  a u d i o  o r  v i s u a l  t a p e s  w i l l  b e  e r a s e d  a n < j ( o r )  
ident i f iers wi l l  be removed f rom completed survey Instruments:  ^  j  
Month Day Year 
Signature of  Head or  Chairperson Date Department  or  Administ rat ive Uni t  
Dec i  I  on o i  the Univers i ty  Commit tee on the Use of  Human Subjects in  Rj- j^arch;  
i  I  Pro ject  Approved j^ ]  Project  not  approved No act ion reqi i red 
C^^rge G. Karas 
Name of  Commit tee Chairperson Date Signature of  Co ml t tee Cna ruer :on 
Revised 5/78 
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NOTICE TO SUBJECTS 
The purpose of this experiment is to discover how people perform 
on a task involving scrambled words. We are also interested in 
discovering how people understand their performancey and how they 
understand the performance of others. You will be given a list of 
words whose letters are not in the proper order. Your task will be to 
unscramble the letters to form words. There are 20 words on the list. 
You will be given ten minutes in which to complete the list. At the 
conclusion of this task you will be asked some performance-related 
questions. There is an aspect of the experiment which will not be 
clear to you, and which will be explained at the conclusion of the 
e:ç)eriment. 
This experiment is not expected to be of any direct benefit to 
you personally. However, your participation may benefit others by 
providing a broader understanding of human behavior. In doing the 
scrambled word task, some students may experience some discanfort if 
they do not perform as well as they might want. 
You may withdraw from participation in this study at any time, 
for any reason, without penalty. Œhe stu^ is expected to take about 
an hour to complete. You will receive one extra credit point for each 
hour or part of an hour that you participate. 
Your data will be coded to ensure confidentiality. Your name 
will not appear on any of our data sheets, and will not be used in any 
report regarding the results of the experiment. 
If you have any questions at this point, please feel free to ask 
them. 
PRINT your name; 
SIGN your name; 
Today's date: Class & section; 
Time of class; Your age; Sex; 
Your code is; PLEASE write this code somewhere, 
as you will use it on each sheet which follows. 
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APPENDIX F: 
BECK DEPRESSIŒ INVENTORY (BDI) 
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APPENDIX G; 
JANIS-FIELD FEELINGS OF INADEQUACY SCALE 
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APPENDIX H: 
DEPRESSION ADJECTIVE ŒECK LIST (DACL) 
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